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1  Advantages of Individual vs. Focus Group Interviews 
This Appendix provides a summary of the limitations of focus group interviews, advantages of focus 
group interviews and advantages of individual interviews. 
Limitations of focus group interviews 
According to Stewart and Shamdasani (1990), the primary criticism of focus group research has been 
based on the perception that it does not yield “hard   data”   and   a   concern   that   it   may   not   be  
representative of the population.   At a very high level, the disadvantages and potential abuses include: 
 Restricted in the area in which they work well.  They are not intended to develop consensus, arrive 
at an agreed plan, determine the course of action to take 
 Information is perceived to be soft, fuzzy, and lacking in focus 
 A reliance on small sample size and the potential for questionable sampling procedures  
 The group format makes it difficult to research sensitive topics. The confidentiality of sensitive 
information cannot be assured 
 In an emotionally charged environment, more information of any type is likely to increase the 
conflict  
 Groups vary considerably, which means that multiple groups must be conducted to balance the 
idiosyncracies of the individual groups 
 Groups are difficult to assemble with the reluctance of worthwhile, yet vulnerable target 
populations.  The environment must be conducive to conversation, which is associated with 
logistical problems and may require incentives for participants  
 Inherent natural vice, where one (or more) participant is incompetent, of bad character, or 
intolerable  
 Acts of God, which are mainly foibles of panel members, but also include weather, transportation 
gliches, accidents, disease , fatality, instrument failure, etc.  
 Responses are coded in a simplistic, undifferentiated manner which rarely present more than the 
broad categories 
 The researcher may place greater credibility on the findings than is warranted, given  the  “live”  and  
immediate nature of the data collection  
 Summarisation and interpretation of results can be made difficult by the open-ended nature of 
responses 
 Due to the persuasiveness of the technique, clients who are not knowledgeable may believe they 
have  witnessed  “the  truth”and  feel  they  are  qualified  to  judge  the  meaning  and  importance  of  the  
data as well as any ordained researcher. 
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 Generalising findings on to a larger population is a potential misuse.  Referring to Byers and 
Wilcox (1991), the goal of focus groups is to find out why rather than how many’.    Generalisability  
is also limited by the small numbers of respondents, the convenience nature of most recruiting 
practices and the responses are not independent of one another 
 Detailed comparison of data across sessions is not appropriate - instead, broad themes should be 
examined across sessions.  The data are subject to psychosocial factors, but this does not mean that 
they are invalid in the traditional sense of construct validity. 
 
One of the major contributions of the focus group format is  
 
“the  opportunity   to   collect   rich,   experiential   information  by  using  group   interactions”   (Carey,  
1994, pg 235).   
 
However, this produces a corresponding weakness as the group itself may influence the data it 
produces.  
 
The dynamic group process is affected by personal needs, group chemistry, and the skills of the leader 
(Carey, 1994).  The interactional effect has positive and negative implications. The negative effect is 
associated with the limitation placed on the data of the psychosocial factors.  The impact of 
psychosocial factors cannot be separated;  they are part of the contextual fabric that provides the rich 
information.   
 
Carey (1994) argues that the major limitation of the focus group technique is the potential for 
censoring and confirming.  These occur when a participant adjusts his or her own behaviour as a result 
of personal impressions of other group members and his or her own needs and history.  When 
censoring, a participant withholds potential contributions, often as a result of lack of trust of the group 
leader or group members, or the future use of the data.  When conforming, a participant tailors his or 
her contributions to be in line with perceptions of the group members and or the group leader 
 
The tendency towards consensus is more likely to be a problem when a participant has not yet formed 
an opinion and the information in the group session is more likely to affect has or her contributions - a 
“bandwagon”  effect  (  Carey,  1994).   
 
In addition, the results may be biased by the participant effects of (Morgan, 1997; Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 1990;  Fontana and Frey, 1994):  (a) Polarisation ,where participants express more 
extreme views than they would in private; and (b) A very dominant or opinionated members. 
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Further, the results may be biased by the participant-moderator   interaction,   and   the   moderator’s  
observational skills and reporting skills.   Interviewer bias can result if the moderator provides cues 
about the types of responses and answers which are desirable and can either skilfully or unwittingly 
lead the group into consensus.  The bias can be a result of personal bias, the unconsious need to satisfy 
the client, or the need for consistency.     
Advantages of focus group interviews 
Compared to individual interviews, focus groups allow the researcher to observe interaction on a topic.   
They:  
 
“provide   direct   evidence   about   similarities   and   differences   in   the   participants’   opinions   and  
experiences as opposed to reaching such conclusions from post hoc analyses of separate 
statements  from  each  interviewee”.    (Morgan,  pg  10).     
 
Group interviews offer the key advantages of: 
 A rich body of data expressed in the respondents own words and context.  A major assumption is 
that the permissive atmosphere fosters a range of opinions leading to more complex and revealing 
issues through different perceptions and points of view.  Pressure is not placed on participants to 
vote, plan, or reach consensus.  Focus groups can assist in explaining how and why people behave 
as  they  do,  and  provide  the  means  to  probe  people’s  emotional  reactions  to  issues 
 Obtaining in a condensed way the range of different voices.  The differences and similarities 
between the different participants are made directly visible, as are the dynamics between the 
perspectives on a problem 
 Focus groups are argued to possess the capacity to become more than the sum of their participants, 
to exhibit a synergy that individuals alone cannot achieve (Krueger, 1994). 
 Encouraging self-disclosure.  People have a high propensity for self-disclosure when the 
environment is nonjudgemental and permissive 
 New opinions may be formed or present convictions may be strengthened by the open exchange of 
different perceptions. The group format also can aid recall 
 There is direct interaction between respondents and the interviewer, which provides opportunities 
for the clarification of responses, follow-up questions, probing of responses and the observation of 
non-verbal responses to supplement verbal responses  
 Comparatively inexpensive  
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 May be adapted to provide the optimal level of focus and structure 
 The discussions have high face validity  
 Speedy results can be attained.  Focus groups offer utility.  Although it is time consuming to 
develop the interview guide, etc, preparation time is less than that for a survey tool or an 
observation instrument, for example, and there is a quick turnaround time in data collection  
 The sample size can be increased, within time and cost constraints of individual interviewing  
 Being able to address both fairly complex problems and simple issues 
 Being able to be conducted with a wide variety of individuals in a wide variety of settings  
 Data can be obtained from children or individuals who are not particularly literate  
 Results are easy to understand; more sophisticated survey research with complex statistical 
analyses are not always easy to understand 
 Stimulating to respondents. 
Advantages of individual interviews 
Individual interviews offer advantages in terms of (Morgan, 1997; Krueger et al): 
 Greater control over the interview.  The interviewer can use more cues to control the one-to-one 
discussion and the dynamics of the interview may put more pressure on the participants to 
elaborate initial statements with little prompting from the interviewer.  The counterargument is 
that focus group interviews make it easier to conduct less structured interviews, with the group 
controlling the direction of the interview 
 The researcher has more control as participants can influence and interact with each other and 
hence influence the course of the discussion  
 The greater amount of information the participant shares.  A 90 minute session with eight to ten 
participants means that participants only have around a tenth of the time to provide verbal 
information than they would in an individual interview.  Individual interviews also facilitate a 
continuity and completeness of narrative 
 The   researcher’s   heightened   visibility   in   conducting   the   interview   makes   the   interviewer’s  
influence in focus groups more prominent.  In the individual interview, the interviewer is removed 
from many accounts. 
Will individual and focus group interviews produce different results? 
An important issue is whether group and individual interviews will produce different results (with the 
assumption being that one of them therefore must be wrong).  If people do act differently in groups, 
then the different interview styles will reflect the different aspects of the overall behaviour patterns.  
Morgan  (1997) highlights that most topics do not fall neatly into purely individual or purely group 
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behaviour.  The question of which approach to use in different circumstances is largely empirical - 
more research using both techniques could provide the answer as to when to use individual or group 
interviews, or a judicious combination of the two.  Morgan argues: 
 
“Sadly,  with  only  one  or  two  studies  that  provide  thorough  comparisons  of  individual  and  group  
interviews, it is hard to say much about when such differences in context might lead to 
differences  in  results”    pg  13.   
 
Fern (1982, quoted in Morgan) used a controlled experiment to analyse individual interviews and 
focus groups, and did not find that group interviews produced significantly better or more ideas than 
an equivalent number of individual interviews.  However, Fern did find efficiency in that two eight 
person focus groups provided as many ideas as ten individual interviews.   
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2  Copy of Credit Rationing Literature Shown to Interviewees 
This Appendix provides a copy of the summary of the credit rationing literature used in the Senior 
Credit Manager interviews. 
Credit  rationing  occurs  when  financial  institutions  (“FIs”)  do  not  provide  the  level  of  debt  required  by  
consumers.  This can occur when: 
 
The FI does not approve an application for a loan made by a potential borrower 
The FI does approve an application for a loan but offers the borrower a lower amount of money 
than they request 
The potential borrower is discouraged from applying for a loan because they do not expect that 
the FI will approve their loan application. 
 
In a world of perfectly competitive markets, there would be no artificial rationing of credit.  Price, in 
the form of interest rate charged to the individual borrower, would simply determine the quantity of 
credit to be provided.  The rate a borrower would be charged would vary by the risk of default – a 
spread/premium would be applied to the base rate (which is equivalent to a loan where there is no 
possibility of default) to reflect the probability that the borrower would default on his/her payments.  
Note:  The risk on the loan could also be affected by the existence of collateral. 
 
However, an underlying assumption of this argument is that it is possible to identify the risk of default 
for each individual borrower.  In reality, the lending environment is highly complex, and cannot be 
easily reduced to a price and demand equation.  Debt involves the promise of the consumer to make 
repayments according to an agreed schedule sometime in the future.  The borrower’s  propensity  and  
ability to make repayments over a period of time is uncertain, and no two borrowers will be the same.  
This is complicated by incomplete contracts, imperfect and asymmetric information and uncertainty. 
 
The theory of credit rationing provides a model to examine these factors.  It has been developed 
primarily in the context of commercial markets, but it has been argued that the theory can be 
transferred to the retail market.  The theory posits that credit rationing can occur through: 
 
Price rationing, where price in the form of interest rate charged is increased to reflect the 
increased risk premium 
Disequilibrium quantity rationing, where FIs are artificially prevented from offering loans at the 
price to clear the market due to factors such as government regulations 
Equilibrium credit rationing, where lenders choose not to offer the interest rate and loan 
conditions which would clear the market. 
 
Equilibrium credit rationing is the primary focus.  It occurs when lenders do not believe that the 
lessening of the quality of the portfolio and the resulting credit losses and costs of remedial 
management will exceed the income the FI will make from charging the higher interest rate and fees 
associated with the higher risk loans.  The loans will be of higher risk as a result of adverse selection 
(or hidden information, where only higher risk applicants will be prepared to pay the higher interest 
rates) and moral hazard (or hidden action, where existing borrowers have an incentive to undertake 
riskier projects with higher potential returns as they have to offset the higher interest rates). 
 
The theory of credit rationing has focussed primarily on the behaviour of the consumer in affecting 
default risk.  This study will attempt to extend this, to include  the  effect  of  the  “credit  risk  attitude”  of  
FIs – the propensity of FIs to accept riskier borrowers.  The credit risk attitude will vary over time, as 
a result of factors such as competitive pressure to grow market share, and the knowledge and 
experience of credit specialists in the organization. 
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In addition, this study will incorporate the effect of economic risk by incorporating the phase of the 
economic cycle, from periods of growth to recession.  Note:  Industry risk (the industry in which the 
small business operates or the wage earner is employed) will not be specifically addressed, primarily 
as there is minimal publicly accessible data. 
 
Generally, the analysis of credit rationing is made complex by the difficulty in collecting the empirical 
data to support the theoretical model.  In Australia, there is not systematic collection of the level of 
approvals/declinals of loan applicants, nor the proportion of loan applicants who are offered a lower 
loan amount than was initially requested.  Neither has the data been collected on the potential 
borrowers who are discouraged from applying for a loan because they do not expect the FIs will 
approve their loan application. 
 
It is possible to compare information aggregated across the economy on the level of defaults/ 
bankruptcies, in the context of a benchmark home lending rate and economic indicators such as 
unemployment and inflation.  However, the impact on individual consumer behaviour can be inferred 
only.  This is seriously affected by a number of issues, such as the impact of non-price features on the 
attractiveness  of  the  “average”  interest  rate,  and  the  inability  to  segment  the  data  into  sub-groups. 
 
The purpose of this exercise is to supplement the quantitative data that is available through interviews 
with a number of credit experts in Australia, by obtaining anecdotal data on the interaction over the 
last twenty years of: 
 
Consumer demand for debt 
The  FIs’  credit  risk  attitude 
The interest rates charged 
The phase in the credit cycle and the economic cycle. 
 
The following charts are intended as prompts for the interviews. 
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3  Copy of Interviewee Guide for Senior Credit Managers 
This Appendix provides a copy of the Interview Guide which acted as a base for the Senior Credit 
Manager interviews. 
EVIDENCE OF IMPRUDENT LENDING 
Are there examples of imprudent lending due to excess funding, wanting market share and hence using 
inappropriate credit criteria?  If so, when and what? 
 
Is there evidence of reduced credit quality now – Cards, personal loans, consumer mortgage, motor 
vehicle, small scale commercial/ small business?  If so, why?  Is this worse than prior periods?  That 
is,   is   there   evidence   of   volume   lending   (volume   for   volume’s   sake)?     Have   you   seen   cedit   lending  
excesses associated with push for market share in the past cycles? 
 
Is there a mix of prudential lenders versus lenders of last resort?  Has this changed in proportion to 
what has occurred at other times? 
 
If lenders are prudential, why?  What motivates this and why are some more so than others?  That is, 
why are some prudential across the cycle and not others? 
 
By what mechanisms is credit quality decreased? That is, which tends to happen more - based on 
lending criteria and loosen credit policies formally or leave credit policies tight and have more 
exceptions (or people simply ignore credit policies)?   
 
Is there pricing for risk and sufficient loss provisions?  Has this happened (eg. in commercial lending, 
100bp above cost of funds does not leave much room for credit losses)? 
 
What are the good and bad credit policies that spring to mind? 
 
How did the policies originate?  What was the catalyst?  How was the policy developed?  What was 
attractive about the policy at the time?  Did it work? 
 
Examples  of  bad  experiences  …? 
 
What changes would you like to see in credit risk management?  What would you like to be 
preserved? 
 
What advice would you give someone entering a job like yours?  What lessons have you learnt that 
spring to mind? 
 
Is the current level of lending imprudent?  If imprudent, is this similar to prior cycles eg. corporate, 
motor vehicles in the late 1980s? 
 
What is the effect of decentralisation on credit quality? 
 
How should we work out a measure of competitiveness – to track interest spreads and fees as well as 
other forms of non-price competition?  
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LEGISLATION / CONSUMERISM 
 
What effect has legislation had on credit quality? 
 
Do you see a high level of delinquency? 
 
Do you see a high level of bankruptcy?   If so, why is there such a high level of bankruptcy 
(particularly given delinquency is not as high in the industry)?   
 
If  people’s  attitudes  to  Bankruptcy  has  changed,  as  it  now  appears  “easy”,  will   it  change  back  when  
borrowers find it inhibits their lending going forward? 
 
Will there a fundamental shift in the credit cycle due to: 
 Consumerism, with legislation favouring consumers? 
 Consumerism, with consumers simply being more knowledgeable of their rights along with 
bank-bashing? 
 Consumers more prepared to go into Bankruptcy? 
 Consumers more cautious, due to the lingering memory of the recession?  
 
Are  there  some  people  who  are  “bad”  – that is, have no intention to pay – or  are  there  simply  “lucky”  
and  “unlucky”  borrowers? 
 
Disaster myopia could also be affected by regulatory freedom – with deregulation and increasing 
consumerism in legislation, what is the effect? 
 
LEVEL OF DEBT/SAVING 
 
Debt as a % of income has been quoted as increasing dramatically.  What are the reasons for this? For 
example:    Increased  cost  of  living,  so  there  is  no  choice;;  peoples’  attitudes  to  debt  have changed and 
they are simply prepared to live with a higher level of debt? 
 
Is the level of debt a concern – that is, will it blow up or are we simply going to live with a higher 
level of debt? 
 
Do people actively pursue a life cycle saving plan?  Do they smooth consumption according to 
information such as consumer confidence indicators or GDP movements (eg.  if going into the good 
times, will consciously spend more)?  Or do most people act in an unsophisticated way and simply 
spend everything in their pocket?   
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4  Graphical Models Shown to Senior Credit Managers 
This Appendix provides a copy of the graphs and model of the credit risk attitude shown to 
interviewees. 
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5 A Detailed Review of the Issues Raised by Senior Credit Managers 
This Appendix provides a more detailed reporting of the issues raised by Senior Credit Managers than 
provided in the Chapter: Units of Research . 
Is there pricing for risk? 
The  common  theme  has  been  that,  instead  of  pricing  for  risk,  FIs’  pricing  is driven by the desire for 
volume  in  a  competitive  market  which  is  “awash  with  liquidity”.   
 “We  aren’t  pricing  for  risk.     We  all  are  just  pricing  and  negotiating  for  market  share.     Trying  to  
pick  quality.    Okay,  I’ll  back  the  people  and  hope  nothing  will  go wrong over here ...  There is that 
sort  of  competition  out  there.    Does  not  help  you  do  what  the  text  book  says  you  should  do” 
 “If   you   are   pricing   for   credit   risk   correctly   and   operating   within   that,   then   you   will   have   no  
problem…  The  difficulty  is  that  no lending institution tends to do that. They tend to run with the 
pack.    They  look  for  balance  sheet  growth  rather  than  consistency”     
 As a group of Australian lenders, FIs are not aggressive in pricing for risk – it is obtained as a 
product with standard pricing.  At the top end of the market, there may be a bit of special pricing.  
“There  doesn’t  seem  to  be  a  demand  for  it,  funny  enough”. 
  “Organisations  do  not  maintain  consistent  credit  policies  purely  due   to  balance  sheet  growth.   If  
you want to grow the balance sheet, and economy only growing by 4% per annum, the only place 
you  can  get  your  balance  sheet  growth   is  by   taking  other  people’s   share.     The  only  way   to   take  
other   people’   share   is   to   price   competitively   or   lower   your   credit   standards   or   both.  And   that’s  
what  we  are  seeing  …  As  the  availability  of  funds  to  lend  increases  and  competitiveness  increases,  
the  pressure  on  credit  gives..  They  lost  the  credit  culture” 
 Competition    “forces  our  hand.    If  we  want  to  be  in  it,  we  have  to  compete”     
 An interviewee argues that it is very hard in this competitive market to price for risk, where 
competitors  aren’t  factoring  in  pricing  for  risk.  “You  can’t  tell  everybody  to  go  to  the  competitors  
– you  have  got  to  compete  in  the  market  to  some  degree”.    As  a  market group,  FIs  don’t  price  well  
– they   price   to   the   bottom   level   of   the   potential   pricing   range.         “An   element   of  maintaining   a  
position  in  the  market  and  a  time  you  walk  away”. 
 “Market   forces   determines   what   your   pricing   is.      Everyone   understands   pricing   for risk.  But 
market  forces  drive  where  you  end  up  in  the  end”  “The  market  has  driven  margin  down  and  you  
cannot  price  for  risk  anymore  ..  we  are  not  getting  the  right  around  of  margin  for  risk” 
 “It  is  a  market  forces  issue,  other  than  pricing  theory,  which  affects  everything  we  do”. 
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FIs do not price for risk as: 
 “What  happens  in  home  loans  in  Australia  is  that  rate  for  risk  return  is  thrown  out  the  window  by  a  
thing called Mortgage Insurance.  Mortgage Insurance compensates lenders for doing a higher risk 
loan”  (LVR  greater  than  90%  higher  risk  than  LVR  of  50%).    “The  risk  of  loss  is  transferred.    So,  
what  we  have  is  the  transference  of  risk  through  that  pricing  mechanism”. 
 Over the 25 to 30 years of a typical home loan, circumstances of customers can change either to 
their advantage or disadvantage.  It is argued that credit scoring works only over a five year time 
frame.  Hence, there needs to be some other form of assessment used and the credit rationing 
argument does not work 
 “However   you   cannot   price   risk all the way through because of the issues such as the uniform 
credit  code”   
  “Think  some  of   (credit  price)   is   inelastic  – people do not behave on the basis of price on what 
they take on.   They behave on the basic of convenience and prestige and reward points.  And 
therefore  that  distorts  the  price  elasticity”     
 With the interest rates for secured products, the premia are too small to show in interest rates.  In 
unsecured products, there have been no price wars or movement 
 FIs  don’t  want  to  charge  a  really high rate because people will go under.  There is a level of debt 
which is socially optimal.  Most people live well when credit is free 
 “Rewards  systems  clouds  the  pricing  issue” 
 “Can   argue   that   at   the   lower   cutoffs,   you   can   have   a   differential   interest rate.  That becomes 
extremely difficult to manage and prociess because how do you market it?  If you are doing 
volume applications via direct access an phone how do you deliver what the interest rate will be to 
the customer when they query?  And the current design of the letters of offer under the consumer 
credit code make it extremely difficult to do so.  You have the letter of offer situation, you are 
talking  to  the  customer  and  saying  “Oh  well,  what  can  you  afford”  and  go  through  the  assessment  
and then  you  might  be  changing  the  interest  rate  on  them.    You  can’t  do  that”   
 “If  apply  price  rationing  theory,  ignoring  mortgage  insurance,  because  of  capital  cost,  we  have  a  
major issue of selling into the market place.  And no lender does that at this stage.   Secondly, if 
you look at people at high LVR ratios, they are the people who can least afford the higher interest 
rates”.   
 There is a perception that there has been cross-subsidisation, with overpricing of other products to 
compensate for underpriced home loans  and  get  an  overall  return  on  the  total  portfolio.      “Makes  
credit  rationing  not  happen  …  We  can  make  a  premium  on  that  product  to  compensate  for  the  non-
return  we’re  making  on  this  side”.    It    opens  the  door  for  competitors  for  cherry  picking  – which 
has been seen in home loans and is expected next in Cards 
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 With the continuing credit contract, the customer may be acceptable now, but they may run into 
trouble   in   the   future.     When   they  are   in   trouble,   “do  you   increase   the   interest   rate   (but   run   into  
consumer credit code and normal law of contract issues) and secondly does it overcome the 
problem you face?  It does not.  I do not see that that theory can work in a practical sense to any 
great  degree”. 
 
Differential  pricing  is  demonstrated  through  “relationship  pricing”: 
 On business loans, not residential secured (standard interest rate)  
 For customers who have been customers with one of the FIs for greater than five years. 
 
There has been a desire to increase non-price competition: 
 “Would  like  to  find  good avenues for non-price competition.  The ability to compete strongly on 
price is relatively narrow.   So you have to have a proposition where you will compete strongly on 
service  or  other  types  of  things.    It  is  actually  quite  hard  to  do  ..  We’d  like  to, we’re  trying  hard  to,  
but  you’re  ability  to  sustain  competitive  advantage  is  actually  quite  difficult”    ANZ 
 
The pricing / credit cost calculation should incorporate the tangible and intangible cost of collections: 
 “We  have  grown  up  with  a  view  that  a  bad debt  is  a  bad  debt    and  there’s  no  good  price  for  a  bad  
debt”.    It  was  argued  that  the  FI  was  a  prime  institution  which  should  not  be  dealing  in  that  end  of  
the  market.      “Chasing   up   and   collecting  money   is   an   expensive   thing.      Time   spent   in   fiddling  
around with a nuisance is time spent not being out in the market place talking to your good 
people.” 
 It is argued that reducing cutoff score may lead to less level of return.   This may be acceptable, on 
average, because it is not costing the FI any more to get the loan, because the costs of marketing, 
management , etc, have already been incurred.  However,  it is necessary to factor in the cost of 
collections  and  adverse  publicity  and  moral  obligation  of  lender.    “So,  may  appear  profitable  at  the  
lower cutoffs, it  is  not  worth  doing  because  of  all  the  situations  that  apply”. 
 
Terms and conditions as well as pricing are being relaxed (such as covenants and loan-to-security 
ratios). 
 
 
The  basics  don’t  change 
There   is   a  widely  held  perception   that   the  basics  don’t   change.   However, the Banks have exerted 
considerable resources to improving their management of risk:  
 
 “There  really  has  been  a  strong  effort  to  manage  risk  better.    And  that  manifests  itself  in  a  number  
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of ways. Policies were adjusted.  Conscious effort to increase skills in managing credit.  
Authorities were reduced.  In a number of ways – organisationally, functionally, processes, 
procedures, commitment of resources at board level ot manage these things better, different 
reporting   lines”.      The   effect   has been vertically through all portfolios – corporate to small 
businesses   with   more   common   themes.      However,   “The   “Cs”   never   change.      How  
(organisationally, systems, skills, staff) respond to it does not change much.  You could commit 
resources to continuing to grow the business, or you could commit that degree of management 
effort, resources and capital to managing risk better.  They both have certain outcomes – choice of 
best  return.” 
 Having been through the cycles of the 1960, 1974, 1984, and the late 80’s    “Organisationally,  the  
response  to  them  has  only  been  marked  in  the  last  one”.    The  previous  ones,  if  there  was  more  of  a  
rationing  type  thing  the  effect  was  not  perceptible.    This  time    …  “We  did  not  respond  by  rationing  
credit, but by trying to manage risk better.  And that manifests itself in a variety of ways.   The end 
result of that, in trying to manage risk better, the end effect is some type of rationing because 
lower risk credits probably have found it more difficult to get access to credit as a result of how 
we’ve  tried  to  deal  with  the  better  managers  of  risk”. 
 
There is a common perception that policies have not actually changed dramatically: 
 “In   terms   of   policy,   was   more   trying   to   increase   skills   and   trying   to   tidy   up   our   organisation  
response  to  it”.    There  has  not  been  an  enormous  change  in  policies,  but  restrictions  have  been  put  
on credit authorities and escalations on the risky types of business. 
 “traditional  lending  policies  still  there.    Very  subjective  in  terms  of  credit  assessment”   That is, the 
decreased credit standards have been affected more through the interpretation of policies has 
changed rather than changed policies. 
 
There has been a significant effect on the marginal cases: 
 There has been a change in the proportion of marginal customers which were acceptable but only 
marginally so.  Thus, there has not been a change in standards, but just a move in the low end of 
the score 
 “I  don’t   think  we  actually   tightened  up   ..     The   effect  of   a  number  of   changes  were   to   see  poor  
credits rationed – in  a  sense  a  degree  of  tightening  up…    Worthwhile  businesses  with  an  average  
case  to  sell,  did  not  experience  any  difficulty  in  getting  credit.    At  the  margin”.    The  objective  was  
trying to recognise the type of projects that do have more risk in them and setting tighter standards 
for  those  types  of  industries.    “Individual  cases  within  highly  risky  industries  were  still  able  to  get  
credit  …  strength  on  underlying  proposition  but   it  meant   the  more  marginal  ones   found   it  more  
difficult to get credit” 
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 “Housing  more   affordable   leading   to  more   applicants  on   the  margin   leading   to  more  high  LVR    
therefore  more  get  through”. 
 
Whilst formal policies may not change, the underlying message that the focus on credit has changed is 
conveyed: 
 “Policies  not  changed,  but  subliminal  message  has”    in  terms  of  easing  lending  standards 
 What perhaps happens is the power emphasis.  In a recovery situation from the Managing Director 
down, there was a lot of emphasis on recoveries, provisioning levels, putting in place management 
systems.      Indirectly,   that   directs   general   managements’   attention,   that   would   say   we   are   not  
focusing   on   selling.   “We   don’t   do   it   consciously.      We   tend   to   do   it   by   way   of   saying  
managements’  emphasis  is  pushed  one  way.    Anecdotally,  credit  officers who can approve credit 
probably   feel  more   powerful   in   that   situation.      Less   intimidated   by   the   line”.     Thus,   indirectly,  
credit is rationalised, as the Bank is tighter and stronger in its decisions.  The interviewee does not 
report any direct evidence of underwriting standards being changed. 
 
Exceptions management is important: 
 “Policies   can’t   be   broad   enough   for   every   deal   (the   one-offs which are really good quality, 
regardless)”.    There  should  be  a  process  to  allow  the  deals  to  be  written  anyway  if  they are good. 
 
FIs have been evolving from the Managing Director / Chief Executive Officer level: 
 “MD  /  Bank  evolving  over  time  – don’t  like  taking  losses  and  has  come  down  from  there”   
 “You   have   to   be   a   change   agent   these   days,   and   look   at   better  ways   to   do business”,  with   the  
message coming from the CEO . 
 
The  “power”  of  credit 
Interviewees  take  a  pragmatic  view  of  the  relative  “power”  of  credit  across  the  cycle,  in  terms  of  the  
risk / reward tradeoff..  The periods of high visibility of credit losses afford the credit risk managers 
opportunities to obtain focused resource on the credit risk infrastructure: 
 
 “Basically   focuses   the   management   of   credit   on   the   process   cycle  …      Head   of   credit   had   the  
opportunity   to   focus   management’s   attention   on   credit.      Could tighten up prudential policies, 
implement objective risk grading systems.  Credit tends to take that opportunity to push through 
change.    Which  isn’t  rationalising  credit,  it  is  in  fact  improving  the  credit  process” 
 “Organisationally,   much   stronger   case   to   invest   in   managing   risk”.      In   the   early   eighties,  
organisationally, we did not commit enough resources to mange this very important function to the 
degree it should have got.  So when the loss piled out we struggled to respond to that.       
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Obviously, there  was  never  a  better  time  to  get  an  allocation  of  capital  and  resources  and  effort” 
 All  the  changes,  plus  legislative  changes,  “have  been  pushed  through  because  credit  had  the  power  
to do it and the momentum to do it.  We had that window of opportunity.”    You  get  that  window  of  
opportunity – if  you  don’t  grab  it  when  its  there  then  you  aren’t  getting  better.    The  last  one  they  
had, they took the opportunity, if only establishing a framework of portfolio management, 
dynamic provisioning, scoring, specialised unit, automated processing systems, segregation of 
duties, etc. 
 Living through the big losses puts the focus on credit.  Why not continue throughout:  The 
memory is there, but nobody listens or asks. 
 
However, periods of high visibility of credit losses damages the credit image. 
 “Downside   of   credit   losses   is   that   credit   loses   credibility.     Management   there   are   at   the   time   is  
blamed, so their corporate memory is discounted (even if they still are there). Commonsense tells 
you,  as  a  banker,  …  part  of  my  role  is  to  get  credit’s  credibility  back”     
 With  regards  to  the  possibility  of  frauds  with  electronic  banking:    “Even  if  we  foresaw  it,  not  sure  
we  can  do  much  about  it”.    Henny  Penny    - the  sky  is  going  to  fall  in.    “Its  not  good  being  a  henny  
penny when everyone else is saying it is okay.  Challenge is trying to predict where the next 
problem  will  be”.   
 
Lending practices across this cycle 
The factors which appeared particularly pertinent to this credit cycle are outlined in this Section. 
The impact of deregulation has been commented on: 
 “Deregulation   undoubtedly   was   heavily   at   the   table   of   what   happened   in   the   late   eighties   .    
Deregulation lifted off the constraints of capital and the supply / demand thing which had shielded 
banks all through the history in  Australia  prior  to  that”.    With  competition  and  other  things  it  had  a  
front row seat in what happened. 
 
A  commonly  highlighted  issue  has  been  the  effect  of  the  “massive  credit  losses  they  were  taking”  in  
the early 1990s, which threatened to close the business down.  Shareholders were not getting return on 
their money: 
 
 Problem loans triggered it, and then to survive the FI had to cut costs, and to be a competitor in the 
retail market, we are just selling commodities.  There is no allegiance to the bank – really it is just 
price.    Hence  we  have  to  be  the  lowest  cost  competitor.    “You  change  the  way  you  lend  money” 
 “Having   just   gone   through   the   economic   recession  we   went   through.      Came   out   of   that   and   a 
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change  in  the  culture.    Changed  the  structure.” 
 
One interviewee comments that the most recent cycle was markedly different from prior cycles.  
 Prior cycles were not nearly as intense with regards to actual losses and effects on profits and 
capital  (the  cycles  of  the  1960,  1974,  1984,  and  the  late  80’s).    “Organisationally, the response to 
them   has   only   been   marked   in   the   last   one”.   …“Undoubtedly   because   the   last   cycle   was   so  
devastating   in  terms  of  losses.     Organisationally,  we  had   to  respond  positively   to   it…    We  were  
fighting  for  survival”  due  to  loss  of  (nearly  all  our  capital).    It  was  a  a  worldwide  cycle.    “The  prior  
cycles   were   Australia   only,   and   even   within   Australia,   it   particularly   hit   property   speculators.”    
There were flow ons to other industries, but the core of business was not very much affected.  The 
last economic cycle was much more persuasive in what it affected in Australia. 
 
Amongst   the  Banks   interviewed,   there   is   a   common  perception   that   “its   everyone  else”.     The  other  
“Top  Nine”  banks  have  been  “busily  lowering  credit  standards  to  write  volumes”.    None  of  the  Banks  
reported themselves as having lowered standards! 
 The   Majors   have   forgotten   the   basics   already.”   “For   the   large   most   complicated   exposures,   I  
actually  go  out  there  and  have  a    look  myself  …  we  go  out  there  and  kick  the  tyres.  …  but the Big 
Four  Bank  have  said  you  are  not  allowed  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  client”.     
 Big Four and some of the regionals are lowering standards – volume  for  volume’s  sake  – but not 
us 
 “Everyone’s  loosening  up  for  competition,  but  here  we  are  trying  to  be  prudent”     
 “As  avenues  for  profitable  business  get  harder  to  find,  it  may  be  the  need  for  take  on  higher  risk  to  
take   on   the   appetite   for   writing   more   assets.   It   certainly   won’t   come   from   this   bank.      Our  
commitment to strengthening credit and risk management now is that deeply engrained that it 
would really take a top management turnaround to change that across all our organisation – the 
commitment to portfolio management, underlying systems, even the seniority of the appointment 
of the chief credit officer – all those things.  Credit was not empowered previously the way it is 
now.    In  our  bank  at  least,  we  won’t  become  a  fringe  lender” 
 “Banks   are   doing   business   now   which   in   the   mid   80   s   would   have   been   finance   company  
business…  We  have  to  be  careful that  we  have  to  price  for  that” 
 
There  is  not  common  perception  as  to  the  effect  or  extent  of  the  of  the  “lenders  of  last  resort”  on  the  
industry. 
 “More  prudent  lenders  have  stabilised  the  industry,  although  there  still  are  lenders  of  last  resort  out  
there  (the  small  ones  whose  names  you  don’t  know)  who  would  be  pricing  for  risk” 
 There was a perception that there probably were more lenders of last resort now.  In an 
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environment where interests rates start to go up, the true impact of what these people have been 
doing  will  become  obvious.    “very  active  …  with  people  in  the  lower  end  of  the  socio-economic 
system.”  encouraging  people  to  commit  themselves  to  a  level  they  can’t  afford  when  interest  rates  
go up to 11 or 12%.  The interviewee queried whether they have the infrastructure properly sorted 
out, with sufficiently experienced people to handle any problem loans.  Originators portfolios are 
securitised  - just hand back the default loans 
 There was a perception that, if anything, there probably are less lenders of last resort.  In the 
downmarket, they would have had to collect their money and run or they would have been run out.  
“Still  a  couple  of   lenders  who  are  unable   to  assess  risk  as  well  as  others  and  they  are   taking  on  
things we are trying to shed.  They may know more than we do – but there still is a tiered risk 
taking  approach  in  the  market.    Don’t  know  that  they’re  pricing  it  any  differently,  they  just  have  a  
different  perception  of  what  the  credit  exposure  is” 
 The industry does not have the Tricontinentals  or  Pyramids  around.    “I  don’t  know  where  the  next  
generation of high risk lenders will come from – maybe  the  regional  banks” 
 “  ‘Benchmark  rate’  – add a couple of percent on top of where current interest rate is.  Have heard 
that people like the originators  are  not  acting  like  this” 
 
The stage in the credit cycle in terms of the credit risk model, at the time of the interviews in fourth 
quarter 1996, has been given as: 
 Arrogance / disaster myopia (on the credit risk model) 
 “Writing  volume  for  volume’  sake  …  I  have  never  seen  it  work.    Because  credit  is  a  cycle.    The  
wheel  will  turn  again.    Very  nice  to  know  when…” 
 Credit standards in the market generally have lowered, due to the pressure to write business  
 “If  you  have  the  capability  and  you  can  prove your ability to meet your obligations under a loan 
you   can   get   a   loan   very,   very   easily   today  …  There   are   people   trying   to   re-create the excesses 
again” 
 “We’re  at  the  point  where  there  is  potential  for  people  to  get  in  strife”.      The  FI  has  put  in  systems 
now to manage the risk, being much more selective,  But, overall, there is a much more aggressive 
level with more players in the market (eg credit unions, regional banks expanding into other 
regions,   finance   companies).     …  On   average,   there   is   the   feeling that the policy side is tighter.  
Everyone has policies written now – before people just knew what they were.  Most people have 
centralised their operations which means policy much more likely to be adhered to 
 They are loosening policies, six years later.  Firstly, disaster myopia is setting in, and secondly, 
other lenders who have not gone through the cycle and all the risk is transferred (mortgage 
insurance) anyway.  Mortgage insurers are in disaster myopia and overreacting when it looks like 
the worst is over anyway   
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 Financial   institutions  weren’t  as  cashed  up  as   they  are   today.     They  were  starting   to   look  at   the  
problem loans – just look at the capital requirements.  We are awash with liquidity now. 
 
Interviewees reported very limited organisational learning with regards to the credit cycle: 
 “Every  credit  cycle  we  do  the  same  thing  and  we  are  going  up  the  ladder” 
 “We  have  short  memories” 
 The key is the management controls and the longetivity of people.  It does not take long in a five 
year cycle for the people who were involved to have gone.  There has to be a focus on training up 
new people.  The FI should not perpetuate what you might have seen.  There were signficant 
improvements  in  how  to  recover  money.  …  “we  got  smarter  at  getting  money  back”.      The FI has 
much better at investigative accounts, which has helped the experience level 
 
Another interviewee focuses on the importance of experienced credit managers: 
 “Trying  to  bring  the  experiences  you  have  gone  through,  having  gone  through  probably  the  worst 
economic cycle since the depression of the thirties.  Use that as a very recent example of why we 
should be doing things better and not falling back.  My own personal view is that within twenty 
years we will have forgotten what happened in the early nineties.  Probably less.  There are still a 
few of us around who will stop it happening.  And the reason I say twenty years is that people who 
are  in  their  late  30s  early  40s  will  be  gone  out  of  the  industry  by  then”…    “You  can  still  be  in  the  
situation where  you  worked  at  the  time  the  recoveries  come.  But  if  you  weren’t  actually  having  to  
recover   the  money  you  don’t   experiencing   it”      “We  experienced   the  heartache,   the   anguish,   the  
people   committing   suicide,   all   those   things   ..   and   we   don’t   forgot   those   sort of things easily.  
Whereas   once  we   go,   that’s  when   the   cycle  will   turn   itself   again”  …  “It   is   up   to   us  who  went  
through  the  experience”. 
 
Throughout  this  last  business  cycle,  there  has  been  a  fundamental  change  to  “the  way  we  do  business”  
in credit with the transition to a portfolio-based approach from a traditional transactional model: 
 The Bank has been developing policies and procedures in a Product Program format,  writing key 
performance indicators for sales and marketing profitability and credit risk management for each 
product, and setting monthly monitoring.  However, (the interviewee reports) that it has been lip 
service, and they have to make it part of the culture 
 One  interviewee  comments  that  they  have  looked  to  the  United  States’  model.    “We  tried to take a 
little  piece  of  everything  we  saw  and  put  it  into  an  amalgam  …  it  doesn’t  work  like  that”    Now  in  
process of doing some refinement, with one of the challenges being just understanding the 
productivity cost – “you  need  to  spend  a  lot  of  money  on credit, but what is the right amount to 
spend?”     
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 “Sometimes  we   in  credit  have  got   to   look  after  the  bank  against   itself  as  well  …  If  you  apply  a  
credit culture to everything you do .. its just risk reward  .. you have to recognise what the level of 
risk  is  and  you  plan  for  it”.     
 
Mortgage insurance has been sited by a number of interviewees as changing the dynamics of the 
secured lending process: 
 One interviewee reports that Mortgage insurers change the attitude of branch staff, in that they will 
get the approval from the Mortgage Insurer and tell the central credit area that they already have 
approval.  The Branch staff seem to think it is a safety net, when really there would be costs   
 “The  willingness   of  mortgage   insurers   to   go   to   95%  and   the  market out there certainly enables 
them  to  write  a  lot  more  loans”.   
 
The  possibility  of  mortgage  insurers  coming  under  pressure  from  a  “run”  on  insurance  claims  also  has  
been raised: 
 From a mortgage insurance point of view, three things must happen concurrently in a recessionary 
period: High interest rates, unemployment and downturn in property stock.  They only occur rarely 
– get two out of three every, say, seven years and only get all three every, say, ten to twenty years  
 “If  economy  every  went  into  freefall, and properties off 30%, what impact on Mortgage Insurers to 
meet  repayment  claims?” 
 
Banking credit operations 
There have been variable responses as to whether the decentralisation of operations had an effect on 
the management of credit standards.  A representative from a Bank which had decentralised operations 
states: 
 “Decentralisation   is  more  difficult   for  top  management   to  manage.      In   theory,  with  best  systems  
and process its eminently manageable.  But, without that strong core ethic and disciplined culture 
…  it  created  the  opportunity  …  The  difficulty  for  top  management  to  respond  to  the  situation  and  
get consistent and committed responses to manage things the way it should have been is more 
difficult   …   Unfortunate   we   decentralised   to   the   extent   we   did   over   the   period   …   A   lot   of  
organisation distraction in managing decentralisation. in way we do business ..new people in new 
roles, with organisation trying to have a strong marketing / sales focus  ..  very much part of 
decentralisation is - here are your  resources,  you  just  go  and  manage  it,  you  just  go  and  do  it”  .    In  
addition,  the  increase  in  people’s  authorities  was  immense 
 
However, a contradictory view is provided by another (relatively centralised) FI: 
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 “You  can  decentralise  as  long  as  you  make  sure you have a rigorous program of making sure that 
people   are   behave   in   line  with   their   discretions   and   the   policies   are   being   adhered   to”.      There  
should be caps on credit authorities, and escalation if an application involves an exception or a 
bigger loan amount.  Credit authorities should be subject to ongoing appraisal and inspection.  
Decentralised  residential  home  loan  approvals  and  did  not  see  a  deterioration.    “Decentralisation  is  
not the issue – it  is  how  you  manage  it  that  matters” 
It is argued that the centralisation / decentralisation cycle will happen again: 
 The winds of change are occurring again – decentralisation  is  occurring  again.  “If  you  see  enough  
cycles,  you  see  great  desires  of  organisations  to  rebuild  themselves  in  previous  ways” 
 
The need for increased controls was highlighted by a number of interviewees: 
 One  interviewee  reports  that,  due  to  pressure  on  sales’  staff  time,  their  managers  don’t  want  them  
to do annual reviews.  However, the abolition of annual reviews was not offset by other controls  
 The need to establish controls to prevent collusion with valuers is sited by one interviewee 
 The separation of credit functions, with salesforce being a separate unit and using brokers leads to 
a culture change and means you have to change the way  you  do  business.    “Have  to  be  good  at  the  
front  end,  and  on  to  people  in  Collections.    Fraud  is  an  issue.” 
 
The need to have capable credit staff, with a broad base of skills, has been highlighted.  It also is 
emphasised that the traditional form of training – with staff working their way up through the Branch 
system – no longer applies: 
 “A  reasonably  young  team.    In  the  old  days,  came  through  the  Branches”. 
 It was reported that there was hardly any external training courses in credit ..  The training was 
more about advanced training for very experienced people – risk models, managing bank credit 
and macro-economic   influences,   and   not   about   core   credit.      “So   some   of   the   traditional   credit  
training  won’t  be  an  option…  We  will  need  to  train  for  quite  different  skills  in  the  future” 
 “Its  good  to  have  both  marketing  and  credit  administration  when  in  a  credit  role” 
 “You  can  train  people,  but  you  can’t  train  them  in  common  sense.    Street  wise  and  common  sense  
you   don’t   learn   that   ..   it   develops.      Sometimes   people   just   haven’t   got   it.      They   are   just   too  
trusting”.   
 
Interviewees report significant improvements in their ability to manage credit risk.  A focus on cost 
cutting also is evident: 
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 “We   have   improved   processes   and   underwriting   standards   to   combat   the   change in the sales 
culture and the different organisational structure.  Change in the organisational structure due to 
cost  focus” 
 It has been reported that better application systems and better scorecards have been a struggle to 
get through.  It is very difficult to get the budget to achieve the benefit.  Most of corporate 
strategies and plans on cost cutting through centralised processing, etc . 
 For  credit  cards:    “With  the  use  of  scorecard,  the  technology,  the  know-how, the skills are there to 
manage it better.  At least you know what kind of risk you are taking on and you have got the 
ability to say we will turn it up or turn it down.  It really is a management decision.  There will be 
a risk / reward tradeoff.  You are either going to make money with this degree of risk appetite or 
you  are  not”     
 “Credit  scoring  system  if  they  are  build  correctly  also  control  economic  cycle.    Because  the  nature  
of the applicants tends to deteriorate as the cycle deteriorates and therefore you get a higher reject 
level”   
 It is highlighted that more science / technology  means that credit risk managers know more about 
portfolio analysis and have the capacity to get stable information through tools. 
 
A dissenting opinion on the impact of new methodologies has been made by one of the Regional 
banks (where less work had been conducted on improving the decision support systems): 
 Credit standards loosened but offset by risk assessment tools?  Can still have technology, but if 
you  do  not  lend  badly  in  the  first  place…    The  problem  “is that moving the credit off the books is 
almost impossible when they are going bad.  Whereas with equities and investment theory we have 
the opportunity to bail out of the exposure by on-selling  it  in  the  market  …  Increasing  the  interest  
rate   doesn’t   help,   because   the   customer   can’t   service   the   debt   already.      All   you   are   doing   is  
increasing  your  loss”. 
 
The need to re-evaluate the borrower over time has been raised: 
 An interviewee highlights the problem with household disposable income – what is a reasonable 
level that people need to sustain their lifecycle?  It is a problem in assessing the capacity to pay 
(credit worthiness) but the capacity to service debt changes over time.  This is heightened as there 
are more lifecycle products which stay with customers throughout duration of the lending 
(continuing  nature  contracts).    “We  need  to  assess  them  on  an  ongoing  basis  – move to behaviour 
scoring  and  customer  scoring”. 
 
It has been highlighted that the new way of sourcing business, through Branches and Brokers, 
provides a new set of management issues: 
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 There  is  a  perception  amongst  sales  staff  that  brokers  referrals’  have  to  be  accepted,  otherwise  they  
will never bring any more loans to the FI 
 “They  are  not  measured  on  the  basis  of  the  branch  profit,  but  the  volume of loans written.  Driven 
so much by volume performance, without the balance out there.  Reasonably large deals, we get 
the  balance  in  here”.   
 
The need to work with marketing and the line unit has been raised: 
 “I  would   like   to   think   that  we   could  work better with the line unit – don’t   know   if   it   ever  will  
happen.    If  it  does  not,  we  will  have  to  take  over  more  responsibilities.    If  product  programs  don’t  
work, in terms of KPIs (key performance indicators), monitoring of portfolios,  roles and 
responsibilities,   ie   if   people   don’t   do   what   I   expect   them   to   do,   then   I   have   to   say   that   my  
framework is not working.  If my framework is not working, then I have to change it.  He will 
manage across business cycles – so have to put in something that works.  If they  don’t  do  what  
they  are  meant  to,  then  it  is  not  working.      “Generally,  pick  it  when  it  is  your  time”.   
 
It  is  reported  that  there  has  been  a  challenge  with  the  move  to  “business  ownership”  of  credit: 
 “People  who  are  supposed  to  own  the  products,  are  really more marketers and advertising.  They 
really do not understand the whole perspective of managing the portfolio.  Through from the 
approval,  maintenance  of  a  loan” 
 
After-sales service also has been raised as an issue:  
 “after-sales service is not looked after properly ...  Everything is centralised, and ownership of 
customers  has  broken  down”. 
 
Credit  authorities  also  have  been  raised  as  a  priority:    “Its  an  ego  thing” 
 
The need for consistency is emphasised:  
 “Competition   is  driving  people   to  write  deals – they go from one part of the organisation to the 
next  part  to  get  approved”   
 
Consumerism and legislation 
The reporting on the impact of legislative changes has been mixed: 
 One interviewee comments that credit legislation has had much impact on credit – did on the 
documentation side 
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 “I   don’t   know   if   it   will   affect   the   credit   cycle.      It   probably   is   going   to   be   more   restrictive   to  
consumers to get more access to credit.  Consumer groups will see that some segments are 
disadvantaged (costs, inflexibility,  restrictions)  which  people  don’t  want.    Organisations  will  have  
to re-price  transactions  to  reflect  higher  costs”   
 “Do  not  think  new  consumer  code  will  have  a  major  effect,  unless  they  were  not  covered  by  the  
credit act previously (for example, credit  unions)”. 
 
Interviewees responses to the effect of consumerism have been varied: 
 People  are  more  aware  of  the  credit  act  and  what  credit  providers  can  do  to  them  …  “if  you  can  
defeat  your  banker,  you  are  a  hero” 
 “Consumerism  – laws changed, all weighted toward  the  consumer” 
 An interviewee reports that the new Consumer legislation has not changed the approach that 
consumers have to credit, and that consumers awareness of credit has been heightened by the 
media and the competition 
 “I  don’t  think  that  consumers are any more knowledgeable than they were.  I think consumers have 
been  conned   and   the   consumers   are   easily   conned”.      Professional   people   in   the  market   place,   a  
small   percentage,   are   more   aware.      “The   average   consumer   today   is   still   extremely   naïve   and 
easily   lead”   for   example,   they   only   look   at   interest   rate,   “haven’t   got   the   capacity   of   actually  
understanding  the  long  term  cost”. 
 
Borrowers propensity and ability to pay and saving rate 
All  respondents  report  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  borrowers’  to  bankruptcy: 
 “Bankruptcy  high  and  defaults   low  because  people  who  would  have   stayed   in  default   are  going  
bankrupt  because  of  attitude” 
 “The  stigma  is  not  there  as  much.    People  can  just  roll  over  and  start  again” 
 An interviewee argues that younger market were treating a home loan as cheap rent.  With 
negative equity in the place, the youth market can bankrupt themselves, then walk away.   A 
different attitude is the reason, rather than inexperience in managing credit 
 “A  colossal  increase  in  propensity  of  the  community  to  take  on  increased  personal  debt.  And  that’s  
occurring in a variety of ways across the whole board.  To do with the structure of society as well, 
higher degree of home ownership, greater desire to take on credit to satisfy these things.  So, 
personal bankruptcy is attitude to debt, attitude to savings.  Strong appetite not to save but to 
acquire  things” 
 “Societal  change  where  people  instead  of  taking  ownership  of  their  own  problems  tend  to  blame  
other  people  …  You  gave  me  the  money  therefore  your  fault  …  Denial  of  responsibility” 
 One interviewee argues that there is not a strong correlation between bankruptcies and  
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unemployment, although the correlation may be strong regarding the rate of change.  The issues 
with  bankruptcies  “is   the   level  of  over-commitment  we  are   securing   in   the  market   and  people’s  
ability   to   service   that”.     Since  deregulation,  we  have   seen  an   increased  proliferation  of   lending.    
Also, people are more willing to go bankrupt now –an  attitudinal  aspect.”  In  the  US,  the  economy  
is  growing,  unemployment   is   falling,   and   they  have   record  personal  bankruptcies   as  well.      “We  
need to build propensity models for bankruptcy into our systems and have that done, rather than 
use  general  indicators  in  the  economy”. 
 
There is mixed reporting on  the  consumers’  knowledge  relating  to  bankruptcy,  or  a  poor  credit  history  
generally: 
 The reason for increased bankruptcies was given as a change in general knowledge 
 “People  realise  now  that  they  will  not  get  credit  if  they  have  a  poor  history” 
 It is argued that personal bankruptcies will continue to grow, as a reduction in interest rate had 
come too late for them. Borrowers are overcommitted and have been for several years and just 
can’t  hold  on  any  longer.    Bankruptcy  “It’s  the  easy  way  out”  but  “lot  of lack of understanding of 
the  implications  of  bankruptcy”  on  credit  record 
 
All   interviewees   report   that   the   vast   majority   of   borrowers   who   default   are   “unlucky”   rather   than  
“dishonest”  (as  discussed  in  the  Chapter  – Credit Rationing): 
 “Mainly  borrowers  are good – there’s  a  small  number  of  cases  that  are  mainly  accidents  …  Well  
intended  people,  uninformed,  or  whatever,  set  of  with  the  wrong  ideas  that  didn’t  turn  out.    Small  
number  of  dishonest  /  unreliable  whatever” 
 “I  have  not  had  a  great  experience  of  that”  (borrowers  making  a  conscious  decision  to  increase  the  
riskiness  of  their  behaviour).    “Borrowers  have  an  obsession  with  their  idea,  and  as  misguided  as  
that  may  be,  it  may  cloud  their  objectivity  in  firstly  committing  their  own  resources  as  well  …  No, 
don’t  hold  with  that  ...  Undoubtedly  there  would  be  some,  but  the  number  will  be  0.0  something.    
The main casualties are through misadventure, with few deliberate attempts.  They would be the 
minority.”   
 “Forgetting   the   professional   fraud,   the   vast   majority of people enter into a contract with the 
intention  to  repay.    Their  circumstances  may  be  such  that  they  can’t  do  it,  and  I  think  the  measure  
of that is the loans which go bad almost immediately.  They are the ones you would have to say 
your assessment procedures  may  not  have  been  as  strong  as  they  needed  to  be”.    The  fact  that  there  
will always be some people who deliberately set out to pay you is factored into scorecards and 
pricing 
 “That  is  bad  luck  or  purely  lifestyle.    But  we  can’t  discriminate  and  we  can’t  ask  people  what  their  
drinking,  smoking  or  other  preferences  are…  nor  would  it  really  help  you  anyway” 
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 “No  borrower  believes  he  will  go  bust.    They  have  access  to  information  but  process  it  incorrectly  
…  Banks  assess  risk  coldly,  but  small  businesses do not take account of small probability of things 
going  wrong.    Too  catastrophic  at  personal  level  to  contemplate”. 
 
The  were  two  key  factors  affecting  “unlucky”  borrowers. 
 “Two   key   factors   for   arrears   and   reasons   for   it:      Unemployment   /   bankruptcy   and relationship 
breakdown – 75%  to  80%”.      The  second  can  often  lead  to  the  first,  as  people  take  their  minds  off  
the  job.    The    FI  has  “two  fully  qualified  counsellors  for  people  who  can  come  and  talk  to  them” 
 Other situation is that security of lifetime employment also is lost, such as Commonwealth public 
servants.  However, these people walk out with substantial redundancy pays and are not a problem 
in  terms  of  repyaments.    “The  problem  we  have  are  people  who  lose  their  job  in  the  normal  course  
of events or  they  become  overcommitted  or  they  face  divorce”.     
 
One interviewee places great emphasis on the FIs prudential responsibility to only provide consumers 
with a level of debt that they are capable of servicing: 
 “People  are   their  own  worst  enemies.  They  always believe that they can afford to do more than 
they  actually  can  and  we  probably  have  to  be  their  protectors  …  Say  to  people  – you believe you 
can  afford  $600  per  month  …  why  haven’t  you  got  this  amount  saved  in  the  bank,  even  excluding  
rent”.      Thus,   “in   a   lot   of   cases   consumers   can’t   afford   what   they   are   looking   for   and   the   FIs  
basically  have  to  look  after  them  and  make  sure  they  don’t  overcommit  themselves”.    “People  are  
really  fooling  themselves  as  to  what  their  ability  ot  commit  themselves  …  if  what they are doing is 
relying   on   an   increased   wage   packet   to   help   them   over   time   they   really   don’t   understand   the  
complexities  of  the  economy.”  Basically,  the  increase  will  help  with  food  and  so  on,  its  not  going  
to  help  with  the  house  plan.    “We  as  lenders  have  to  protect  consumers  from  themselves” 
 It   is   argued   that   the   increased  availability  of   credit   has  not  benefited   all   borrowers.      “Made   the  
consumer who should never borrow money able to borrow money.  And of course they get 
themselves into trouble and then  turn  around  and  blame  the  banks”. 
 
Most interviewees report that consumers are not good at establishing and maintaining savings plans: 
 “People   spend   what   they   earn.      Definitely   unsophisticated   – don’t   think   along   lines   of   good  
economy and bad economy and  should  put  away  more”   
 “These  days,  people  don’t  put  things  away  for  a  rainy  day  (not  like  they  used  to).    Used  to  have  to  
save,  now  people  just  consolidate.    Different  attitude”     
 It is argued that products make it much easier (for example, home equity loan) so you do not have 
to plan ahead for the rest of their life 
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 “I  don’t   think  most  people  do  a   lifecycle  plan  until   they  hit   50  …  95%  of   the  population  don’t  
budget  well  ”,   regardless  of   their  socioeconomic  background.     “The  five  percent  who  do  budget  
probably are the best lending risk irrespective of where they come from or what they do for a 
living  because  they  stay  within  their  means” 
 “With  housing  loans,  people’s  lifestyle  changes  as  they  grow,  they  get  married,  have  children,  two  
incomes down to one income back to two incomes, they have different lifestyle expectations which 
affect  that”     With  the  other  loans  (short  ended  products)  it  doesn’t  have  any  impact  anyway  and  
that is why credit scoring works 
 “In  Australia  we  live  for  today  and  live  for  tomorrow  ..  we  don’t  plan  out    …  people’s  wants  and  
desires  are  always  different  …  something’s  going  to  happen  in  five  years  and  we  recognise  this” 
 
Two interviewees comment that some segments of the population, at certain times, do save: 
 One interviewee comments that he is seeing some quite sensible saving plans, with significant 
events, such as when people get engaged.  The plans maybe are not as long term as the life cycle, 
but over the next ten years, probably. But, he noted, this was a limited sample based on who their 
parents are 
 As to whether consumers will be sophisticated in their planning - “Certain  segments  of  society  do,  
based on where they came from and their experiences and some other people who may not have 
had  those  experiences  may  not  …    As  people go through different phases of their life, as they get 
older  these  things  do  start  to  come  under  control  and  it  just  naturally  sorts  itself  out”.    Further,  “If  
people  are  carrying  a  lot  of  debt,  it  may  make  it  harder  to  consciously  smooth  debt.  …The  whole 
market is putting greater temptations in front of people to do a whole range of things - 
consumerism  and  materialism”. 
 
It has been reported that it is more difficult for people to save and plan in current times: 
 “Cost   of   living   has   far   outstripped   saving.  People are more accepting of debt, but lot of them 
probably  could  not  survive  without  debt.    Need  two  incomes” 
 It  is  argued  that,  in  Australia,  a  long  term  commitment  is  twelve  months  to  three  years.    “We  don’t  
understand   the   concept”   of   long   term   planning   “and   even   if   did   understand   the   because   the  
economic  situation  is  so  volatile,  for  example  superannuation  …  How  are  you  meant  to  plan  for  
your  old  age    …  when  they  keep  moving  the  goal  posts  all  of  the  time”   
 
There has been mixed feedback on the current level of debt: 
 In response to the query whether we have moved to a level of personal debt that is sustainable - 
“Think  we  are  right  at  the  top  edge  of  it” 
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 An interviewee commented that he does not believe people have too much debt.  Whilst people say 
there is not enough savings, we have always been dependent on foreign investment to grow.  He 
does believe there are sections of society which are overcommitted, and there always will be, due 
to their circumstances and attitude to life 
 An interviewee comments that the level of debt (as high as it is) is not a problem. In the United 
States, the high level of Card indebtedness is a major problem.  However, in Australia, where 
borrowers tend to tie financial accommodation with home ownership, it is less likely to be a 
problem 
 “Most  people  will  fully  gear  themselves  at  all  times.    Despite  it,  they  don’t  care”. 
 
Effect of low inflation and interest rates 
Interviewees   have   a   major   concern   with   borrowers’   ability   to   manage   in   an   environment   of   low  
inflation and / or increasing interest rates: 
 “There  is  nowhere  to  hide  any  more”  with  a  low  inflation  level.    If  your  assets  are  not  going  to  go  
up  faster  than  your  debt  is  going   to  go  up,  then  something   is  going   to  go  wrong.     “The  way  the  
community is acting is as if we are still in a high inflationary period.  You have to go and buy and 
borrow  because  if  you  don’t  it  will  cost  you  more  tomorrow”.    It  is  not  sustainable  because  we  do  
not have a high saving level in the first place.   This is where the threat comes in - if interest rates 
are too low, everyone just borrows and borrows.  Bankrupts now relate to people who were able to 
just hang on and were hidden by inflation rate  
 “In  the  past  inflation  and  asset  growth  has  helped  us  in  the  housing  cycle..    That  is  not  occurring 
now.    Someone  who  is  incurring  debts  and  see  their  property  …  grow  30%  in  five  years  and  then  
sell and clear all their debts – does  not  occur  anymore.  So  they    can’t  clear  their  other  debts” 
 “Think   there   is   an   expectation   that   salaries   always   will   increase in the future, which may not 
happen  in  the  future”. 
 
Consumer demand 
Consumer demand also has been raised as a factor affecting the level of credit in the economy: 
 “A  degree  of  uncertainty  in  people’s  minds  as  to  whether  they  wanted  to  borrow  or  not .. So, the 
consumer started to pull back but at the same time the consumer was pulling back you had far 
more financial institutions coming in and being far more aggressive in their desire to lend money 
and maximise their return based on their capital base”. 
 
The future of risk-based pricing 
Interviewees argued that the critical factor for the introduction of risk-based pricing is the requirement 
for a broader-based approach, through customer relationship pricing: 
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 “If  all  go  the  way  of  customer  relationship pricing and customer scoring and so on, which we all 
say  we  want  to  do,  part  of  this  is  having  the  ability  to  price  on  risk”.    Everything  is  driving  us  back  
to the only way to compete is on relationship issues and relationship pricing - we can have the 
same  product,  more  or  less.    “But  we  still  have  got  a  whole  way  to  go  before  people  will  accept  
that there is a cost of banking as well as a benefit of banking.  If you want the service, you will 
have to pay for it..  Then we will pay you on the other side for what you bring back to us.  Until we 
get a market acceptance for the way that is business is done – have to break that before we can 
break  the  other  side”.    Customers  still  want  all  the  services  at  less  than  cost,  as  well  as  low  loan  
rates. Consumer credit  code  means  you  can’t  charge  all  the  fees  you  want  to,  as  well  as  having  to  
lure customers with cash back for taking out a loan with us 
 “We  score  the  customers  profile  of  risk  across  the  total  relationship  we  hold  with  them  so  we  can  
treat them accordingly.  We enter into that field then we are going to move to more rational pricing 
based on our expected return.  Think what we will see is rather than a product based pricing 
rational more of a customer based rational based on customer relationship and the products and 
services they use within an organisation.  We can package and manage the risk better when we 
have  a  full  relationship.    I  think  that’s  when  we  will  move  to  credit  rationing  on  that  basis.    I  don’t  
think we will move to it in any other form until  we  get  there”     
 “When  you  go   to   the   customer   relationship   situation,  you  have  policies   in  place   that  will   really  
measure   the   customer’s  performance,   risk  grade   it,   and   then   treat   the   customer   according   to   the  
ongoing risk grades.  You might well be to the situation where a customer has all sorts of limits in 
place and over say a three month period their circumstances change and their behaviour patterns 
clearly  shows  they  are  changing  and  you  shut  down  those  limits” 
 “A  credit  card  business  alone  is  cyclical. More holistic when relationship lending (ie transaction, 
mortgage,  insurance)”. 
 
Can credit be managed excellently? 
When asked if it was possible to manage credit excellently, a key message from interviewees is that it 
is important to have a solid portfolio, to be able to obtain competitive advantage if competitors are 
needing to repair their balance sheets. 
 “Because  the  major  banks  were  focused  on  their  commercial  side,  we  had  the  opportunity  to  steal  
volume,  so  we  grew” 
 “Have  a  reputation  as  being  good on the credit side.  Must do something different.  People who 
make the decisions.  Why should it be different - An intangible.  Attitudinal is different.  The skills 
are based on similar base education and same market place.  Hence, obviously attitude but the rest 
should  not  be  that  different” 
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Two interviewees comment that there was a large element of luck in the Big Four Bank which had 
managed its credit quality well in the late 1980s, early 1990s: 
 “They  said  they  credit  rationed  their  exposure  (deliberately) but their ability to lend was severely 
constrained by the funding situation at the time.  They just traded off and said where was the most 
profitable  business.     Therefore  they  kept  out  of   the  corporates  and  property  developers”.      It  was    
“Probably  more  by  good  luck  than  good  management  …  Probably  were  more  lucky  because  they  
did  not  have  a  surfeit  of  capital  compared  to  others”  “if  you  look  at  banks  went  into  it  hard,  they  
all had new managing directors and senior management team (and not kept with mainstream 
banking  for  new  hires)” 
 “I   still   refuse   to   accept   (the   CEO)   saying   ‘I   knew   it   was   going   to   happen’,   he   just   punted   on  
something  and  was  lucky”. 
 
Excellent broad-based skills are required to be a good credit risk manager: 
 “Before   in   the   Bank,   they had people who ran credit who were just good at approving credit 
transactions.  Now they have credit risk management, end-to-end – control, monitoring, process, 
dynamic provisioning, etc.  That is, need to know the whole spectrum ... Credit risk is just like 
managing  a  business.    Its  not  just  like  being  a  credit  officer”. 
 
One interviewee comments that he does not think anyone can manage credit superbly over a cycle.  He  
pointed out that one and a half mistakes per hundred are allowed - but it does not take much for this to 
increase   to   five   and   a   half   mistakes.      The   interviewee   further   comments   that   the   FI’s   position   is  
associated with their core group of customers, and whether they can withstand the economic cycle.  The 
FIs really need customers who can re-energise and re-profit themselves to take advantage of the cycle  - 
as long as the company survives through the downturn, and is not too seriously disadvantaged in terms of 
economic position. 
 
Looking forward, FIs are confident of their ability to manage credit risk: 
 “We  actually  understand  the  risk  /  reward  in  a  much  greater  sense.    If  you  look  at  our  organisation  
a  decade  ago,  we  were  actually  very  naïve”. 
 
Active, counter-cyclical lending 
A key theme to emerge from the Senior Credit Manager interviews was the need to pro-actively, and 
counter-cyclically, manage credit across the business cycle: 
 An   interviewee  comments   that  policy  was   loosened   too   late,  but  not   intentionally.      “Deep  down  
reason you loosen too late, not because it is a decision to do that, but because your mind is 
focusing   on   other   things   in   the   future”.      There   is   a   focus   on   yesterday’s   problems   being   fixed 
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today.  Once  the  issues  have  been  identified,  “people  in  the  back  room  to  fix  the  problems  caused  
yesterday, and then stick away and  control  them  somewhere”.      Then,  “There’s  a  light  at  the  end  of  
the  day.    What  should  we  be  doing?  Heh,  we  could  be  doing  some  of  this.  …It’s  not  planning  – it 
is a focus issue – you  are  in  crisis  mode”.     
 
Another interviewee provides an example where an FI had a competitive advantage where they could 
be less stringent in their pricing than competitors: 
 Putting  out  recession  buster  loans  towards  the  end  of  Phase  1”  (that  is,  shock  and  remorse  in  the  
credit  cycle  model  provided  by  the  researcher).    “We  really were saying, heh, we are a lender in 
the  market   and  we’ve   got  money   to   lend  …  You   look   further   forward   ahead   the   less   problems  
you’ve  got” 
 
The need for active management has been highlighted: 
 “Took   too   long   for   the  banks   to   realise   they  were   in   trouble .. Lot of hype and some big falls.  
Even  with  high  interest  rates,  property  prices  were  “just  nonsense  …  “If  anyone  had  really  taken  
the time to stand back and say okay what is holding this thing, what is underpinning this thing, 
then they would have realised there was no floor there and it was going to come down with a 
thud”.    The  banks  should  have  pulled  in  their  horns  in  about  1988  - it was the property market that 
drove down the economy.  
 In retail, put effort into in credit management in late 1991, and losses peaked in fiscal 1992. The 
warning   signals   were   in   early   to   mid   1991.   “But   by   then   the   die   was   cast”.         The   bank   was  
managing  it  in  a  fairly  traditional  way  at  the  time..    “The  payback  from  trying  to  manage  it  better  
came fairly quickly.  That was aided by the turn of the economic cycle plus the benefit of the extra 
effort  tended  to  flow  in  a  fairly  logical  kind  of  way” 
 
However, one interviewee argues that Senior Credit Managers should simply aim for consistent 
standards across the business cycle: 
 “the  pendulum  does  swing  …  By  the  time  the  crisis  has  come,  its  probably  past  and  you  don’t  need  
to   change   your   credit   policies.      Its   all   over.   What   you   try   to   do   is   read   that   in   advance”.    
Organisations now are being driven by their marketing and credit tends to be running behind it a 
little  bit.    “You  should  strive  for  a  consistency  of  credit  over  time,  which  removes  much  of  this  mood  
swing  …  If  you  are  consistent  in  your  credit  assessment  through  what  you  are  doing  you  will  take  
care of the economic cycle by that means.  If you try to second guess the cycles, you probably will 
make  more  mistakes  …  you  will  always  pick  the  wrong  time  and  end  up  with  problems.    The  worse  
thing  you  can  do  is  be  inconsistent  and  change  with  a  good  situation”. 
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6  Copy of Interview Guide Used for Lending Officers 
This Appendix provides a copy of the interview guide used in the interviews in all Banks in the 
Lending Officer interviews. 
 
Background 
 
Thank you for meeting with me to talk about lending practices here at the Bank.   
I am doing a PhD thesis on credit risk management in retail banking at different points in the business 
cycle.  As such, you are helping me personally to complete my study - and once again I thank you for 
that.  In addition, your input will be helping me to build a monitor, or series of questions, which the 
Bank could use to measure its credit risk attitude (or credit culture) at different times. The monitor will 
provide one more tool that the Bank could use to know what is going on, and also provide you with a 
formal feedback loop.  
 
The credit risk monitor will be based on a series of interviews with a number of other banks.  I am 
conducting   interviews  with   about   “x”  Lending  Officers   from   the  Bank.     There  will   be  a  mixture  of  
focus group interviews and one-on-one interviews - I am mixing the approaches.   In terms of why you 
were included (nominated) as a participant - first up, I got the  Senior  Manager’s  okay to conduct the 
interviews,   and   then   he   got   “x”   (or   other  managers)   to   nominate   participants   according to a set of 
criteria.  
 
Outline of the session 
 
Planning to take up to one hour 
Will record the interview.  Any comments you make will be kept confidential.  Your responses will be 
aggregated with other Bank people;  and in the final results I will not be reporting Bank results alone. 
 
If any time you are uncomfortable with a question, let me know.  We can either move on the next 
topic, or we can terminate the interview at any time 
 
Any time I ask a question that is unclear, let me know, and I will try to make it clearer.  
I will be asking you to focus on examples of your actual experiences and perspectives (ie. focus on 
specific situations and actions as perceived by you) rather than your attitudes and general opinions on 
issues. 
   
There are no right or wrong answers;  all opinions are valid and legitimate.  Encourage you to put 
forward  all  contributions,  and  do  not  tailor  them  to  be  in  line  with  what  you  think  other  participants’  or  
your manager would expect you to say. 
 
“Rules”  of  the  focus  group  interviews: 
 
 No   derogatory   statements   about   another   members’   contributions   - there are no right or wrong 
answers 
 Stress that all experiences are equally important 
 As many opinions as possible are sought 
 Objective is to identify all the issues, rather than achieve consensus 
 Solve problems through self-management: 
 If the group gets off the track, someone within the group typically will bring the group 
back to the topic 
 Common problems include:  Getting bogged down in definitions or detail, not all in the 
group contribute equally (some very talkative, some not at all), some participants 
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 “ramble”,  group  leaves  the  primary  topic,  some  participants  act  as  an  “expert”  (none  of  us  
are, as we are addressing each of your perspective) 
 Encourage you to use questions to direct the flow of the interaction 
 Encourage you to respond to each other rather than me 
 
Introductions 
 
Pls introduce yourself (yourselves) - name,  how  many  years   in   lending,  where  you  work  now.      I’ll  
start.  I worked with Citibank for about ten years in credit.  Currently I am working with KPMG as a 
Management consultant.  Whilst I will be familiar with most of the general credit practices and jargon 
in  retail  lending,  I  won’t  know  the  how  these  practices  are  applied  at  the  Bank. 
 
Purpose  
 
The goal of the interview today is to examine how the Bank manages credit risk across the business 
cycle.   
We will focus on how credit standards are tightened or eased, as demonstrated through the controls 
and disciplines by which strategy, policy, and operations are managed.  There are two key objectives:   
 Identify the factors that highlight to you what the credit risk attitude is, as established by Senior 
Credit Managers  
 Determine what you consider to be the key aspects of credit risk management to be able to make 
sure you are booking the loan applications that will result in a good quality loan portfolio. 
 
Key terms 
 
Are you familiar with the following key terms?   These are the definitions we will apply: 
 Credit risk appetite - the  level  of  credit  risk  the  Bank’s  senior management wants to take on.  One 
way to view this is to look at the extremes:  At various times, lenders can either focus on growing 
market  share  rather  than  building  a  good  quality  loan  portfolio  (and  have  relatively  “easy”  lending  
standards) or focus on minimising credit losses rather than maximising the amount of new 
business  (and  have  relatively  “tight”  lending  standards) 
 Credit culture - hard to define - this  is  the  underlying  approach  to  credit,  the  “way  we  do  it  around  
here”.    It  probably  does not change a lot over time 
 Credit standards - the overall approach, which is a mixture of credit policy and credit practices / 
operations. 
 Credit policy - the formal / official lending policies 
 Credit practices, operations - the way the credit policy is applied in a day-to-day, 
operational sense 
 
Initial reactions 
 
 Note down your initial reactions and experiences relating to the questions on the sheet.   (refer 
attached).  These will be collected at the end of the session.  
 
Questions  
 
1 The credit risk attitude in the Bank 
 
 Do you think the credit risk appetite changes over time? 
 What do you think drives the tightening or easing of credit standards 
 Rank the importance of each of the factors 
 How  do  you  know  what  Senior  Manager’s  credit  risk  attitude  is  at  a point in time, based on actual, 
observable behaviours?   
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 amount of business being written 
 changes to credit standards (overall controls and disciplines), credit policy, credit 
operations 
 changes to terms and conditions 
 What reward structures / measures are in place to tell you what you should be doing? 
 Rank the importance of each of the factors 
 State of the credit risk attitude 
 What is the credit risk appetite now? 
 
2 Quality-focused credit culture 
 
 What  are  the  key  “factors”  you  must  have  in  place  and  must do really well for a quality-focused 
credit culture (regardless of where you are in the business cycle) 
 Do these basic factors change, or is it how they are interpreted that changes? 
 Rank the importance of the factors 
 
Closing questions:  
 
“If  you  had   the job of summarising how the whole group (you) feels about this topic, what do you 
think you would say? 
 
Gather sheets 
 
As a result of our discussion today, would you say that your comments on the questions asked at the 
beginning of the interview are: 
 Basically the same 
 Some minor changes (but really only enhancements / additions to the same general theme or line 
of thinking) 
 Some significant changes (that is, fundamental changes to the general theme or line of thinking)  
 
Wrap-up 
 
Do any of you have any final questions? 
Gather the information sheets participants filled out initially 
Please  don’t  talk  about  with  your  colleagues  - prefer  to  get  each  person’s  input  “fresh”  without  them  
preparing for the interview 
Again, I would like to reinforce that your information will be kept anonymous 
Thanks for helping 
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Information Sheet Used in the Interviews 
 
 
The key aspects of credit risk management (relating to both policies and operational practices) 
the Bank must have in place to book good quality loan applications include ... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The   key   indicators   of   the   Bank’s   credit   risk   attitude   (that   is,   the   focus   on   credit   risk   as  
compared  to  other  areas  such  as  sales  growth)  include    … 
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7 Copy of Responses Sent to Banks A, B and C after Lending 
Officer interviews 
The responses sent to Banks A, B and C are shown separately in this Appendix. 
Bank A Cards Lending Officers 
 
Question:     “What  are  the  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management  (relating  to  both  policies  and  
operational practices) which must  be  in  place  to  build  a  good  quality  loan  portfolio?” 
Lending Officers were not asked to rank their perception of how well the current processes and 
practices within the Bank met these key aspects.  However, the issues raised highlight the areas which 
management  should  ensure  are  in  place,  from  the  Lending  Officers’  perspective.     Where  I  perceived  
that an aspect was a major issue for the Lending Officers, I have added a comment in italics.   A word 
of warning:  As I did not specifically ask Lending Officers to rate their satisfaction with the key 
aspects, this is my perception only, based on limited information. 
Topic Description 
Policy “Good”   policy,   focusing   on   the   credit   basics   (such   as   character,  
capacity, collateral) 
Stable and consistent lending policy and decisions 
The intent of the policy is well communicated;   there is sufficient 
information  provided  to  understand  the  “big  picture” 
There is two way communication on policy   
Written guidelines are provided 
There was a strong perception that credit policy and operations were 
too removed from each other. 
Stable and consistent 
lending decisions 
Management provide a stable and consistent lending approach, in terms 
of policies 
A stable and consistent lending approach is supported between Lending 
Officers 
Lending Officers are confident in their assessments, leading to 
improved consistency 
Support and 
communication 
between Lending 
Officers  
On the job training and cross-checking of approve/decline decisions are 
encouraged through ongoing discussion between lending officers.  
More experienced staff assist the newer staff 
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Bank A Cards Lending Officers 
 
 
Topic Description 
Lending Officers 
demonstrating sound 
credit skills 
Stable and consistent lending decisions 
Assessors with sound lending knowledge and experience 
Lending  Officers  felt  that  they  were  responding  to  “the  system”.    They  
were not satisfied with the level of decision-making responsibility and 
the variety of analytical tasks they currently have as compared to the 
past. 
Integration between 
areas 
There is strong communication between areas  
There is consistent policy between product areas 
The different areas (for example, Credit Policy, Loan Operations and 
the Branch/Retail Network) should have common drivers and 
performance measurement.   
There was a strong perception that the above factors are not in place 
currently. 
Management Managers should demonstrate strong management skills, be accessible, 
and support their staff.  There should be a stable chain of management. 
Systems and scoring Systems   should   “work”,   in   terms   of   up-time, reliability, processes 
applications accurately, etc.   
Rules in the system should match credit policy, and not be forced from 
the system unnecessarily for manual review.  
For applications to be processed consistently, the point scores need to 
work for all products 
Systems were a major issue, generally. 
 
  
Bibliography and Appendices: Appendix 7 Page 70 
Bank A Cards Lending Officers 
 
 
Integrity / Morality  Lending Officers should be comfortable that Bank policies are 
prudential – for example, only the borrowers who can afford and are 
likely to repay the debt should be provided with a credit card.   A 
representative  comment  was  “the  credit  worthiness  of   the  applicant   is  
becoming  less  and  less  a  factor  in  decision  making”     
Overall, there was a perception that  customers were being offered too 
much   credit   (based   to   the   Lending   Officers’   experience).      The  
possibility   that   customers   “would   go   straight   to   collections”   was  
mentioned several times. 
Customer focus Existing customers should be recognised  
Learning lessons Policies and practices should incorporate learning from prior 
campaigns 
Statistics and volume Information  is  needed.     A  representative  comment  was  “we’re  closely  
related  to  what  the  stat’s  say” 
Training A mixture of formal and on-the-job training is required.   
Lending Officers felt that very little formal training is provided 
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Bank A Cards Lending Officers 
 
Question:    “What  drives  the  easing  or  tightening  of  credit  standards” 
There was a strong perception that competition and the need to increase the size of the book drove the 
setting of credit policies.  The Cards staff focused on the effect of Campaigns, with significant 
comment being made as to policies changing to assist in acquiring accounts through the campaigns.  
The secondary reason given for the perceived change in the credit standards was productivity, and the 
need for large volumes of applications to be processed.  The third most predominant reason given for 
the changing of credit standards was the level of bad debts or accounts in collections.  Finally, 
Lending Officers mentioned an increased focus by the Bank on meeting customer expectations. 
 
Question:     “What  actually  changes  when  the  credit  risk  attitude  changes?     How  do  you  know  
what the credit risk attitude is at a point in time and what you are meant to be 
approving/declining?” 
Staff focused on policy changes, including: 
 Formal policy changes, as advised through written policies, especially relating to campaigns 
 Policy changes, advised of verbally from management, through team meetings.  There was a 
strong   emphasis   on   the   interpretation   of   managers   comments’   by   the   Lending   Officers   (as  
compared to specific wording of formal documents) 
 Less formal feedback on policy changes and approach, such as: 
 The requirement for all declinals to be subject  to  “hindsighting” 
 The changes in the system / scorecard to approve a higher percentage of loan applications 
 The proportion of approvals to declinals 
In   addition,   staff  mentioned   that   their   own   perception   of   the   “general  well-being of the Australian 
economy”  would  affect  their  predisposition  to  approve  or  decline  a  loan.     
Finally, Lending Officers mentioned the focus on driving the volumes of applications in interpreting 
what the credit risk approach is at a point in time. 
Interestingly, there was very little mention made of formal performance management contracts. 
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Bank A Cards Lending Officers 
 
Question:    “Compared  to  other  points  in  time  in  the  credit  cycle,  what  is  the  credit  risk  attitude  
at  the  moment?” 
Whilst a couple of respondents commented that the Bank was being strict on applicants with high 
lending standards, most respondents commented on: 
 The   drive   for   volume,   with   the   responses   typified   by   “emphasis   on   the   need   to   process  
applications  and  process  them  quickly  too…  We  reduce  our  quality  and  so on”     
 The  need  to  write  more  business,  with  responses  typified  by  “We  want  to  do  the  deal  all  the  time,  
and  rather  than  try  and  find  the  reason  for  declining  it,  they’re  finding  a  reason  to  approve  it.    Or  
help  the  loan  through” 
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Bank A Mortgage Lending Officers 
 
Question:     “What  are  the  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management  (relating  to  both  policies  and  
operational  practices)  which  must  be  in  place  to  build  a  good  quality  loan  portfolio?” 
Lending Officers were not asked to rank their perception of how well the current processes and 
practices within the Bank met these key aspects.  However, the issues raised highlight the areas which 
management  should  ensure  are  in  place,  from  the  Lending  Officers’  perspective.     Where  I  perceived  
that an aspect was a major issue for the Lending Officers, I have added a comment in italics.   A word 
of warning:  As I did not specifically ask Lending Officers to rate their satisfaction with the key 
aspects, this is my perception only, based on limited information. 
Topic Description 
Lending  Officers’  
development 
Training was the most frequently mentioned requirement for a quality 
credit process. 
The inherent ability of Lending Officers was raised, relating more to 
recruiting the right person rather than actual training. 
A few interviewees commented on the educational requirements being 
increased for the Lending Officer (namely, tertiary qualifications).  A 
number of the Lending Officers did not have tertiary qualifications, and 
felt they were not in the position to go back and study.  
Career pathing opportunities was another factor mentioned by a 
number of interviewees. Traditionally, Lending Officers would work 
up   through   the   ranks,   which   “gave   a   good   grounding   in   credit”.    
Without a tertiary qualification, it was commented that      “the   career  
paths  aren’t  there  anymore”. 
Overall, Lending Officers reported that their skills and knowledge had 
decreased, because they were doing less complex tasks and there was 
less end-to-end  completion  of  tasks.    A  representative  comment  was  “I  
used  to  know  everything,  now  everything’s  so  specialist”.     
Interviewees commented that there was extremely little formal training 
provided, and that there should be more.  The potential discrepancy 
between increased educational requirements for Lending Officers, less 
emphasis   on   “coming   through   the   ranks   to   learn   credit”,   and   the  
decreased skills required in the automated Lending process appears to 
be an issue which will have to be managed. 
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Bank A Mortgage Lending Officers 
 
 
Feedback on lending 
quality 
The need for feedback on the delinquency and loss performance of 
loans that Lending Officers had approved was mentioned consistently.  
It was reported that the feedback had been requested a number of times, 
with  a  representative  comment  being    “I  haven’t  heard any feedback on 
my   lending   quality   since   I   started…  No  matter   how  many   times   you  
ask” 
Branch interface The consistent approach of Branches and credit areas was a key 
requirement. 
The role of Branches was seen by all participants to be a major 
concern.  The primary issue was the accurate entry of information into 
the system, particularly as the automated review of loans meant that a 
Lending Officer often would not review a loan to detect problems.   
Lending Officers estimated that there would be any where from a 25% 
to  a  95%  error  rate  in  terms  of  the  “perfect  application”  (including  data  
entry, lending knowledge, etc) in the loans that they reviewed.  It 
should be noted this figure is likely to be inflated for the overall 
portfolio, given the Lending Officers   only   see   the   “exception”   loans.    
The  “really  good  loans”  often  would  be  processed  straight  through  the  
system.  It was felt that a 10% error rate would be more acceptable.   
Lending Officers stated that the level of inaccuracy with Branch-
entered applications was a function of: 
 Insufficient training 
 Branch staff having to handle a large volume and variety of tasks 
 Deliberate  falsification,  given  the  Branch  staffs’  performance  was  
based on volume of loans written rather than their credit quality 
 A need for disciplinary action if Branch staff were found to enter 
data inaccurately 
 Through inexperience, Branch staff believing what the customer 
tells them, even if the information provided was not consistent 
 Taking  the  customers’  side,  to  protect  the  ongoing relationship 
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End to end review of 
loans 
All Lending Officers reported a requirement for clear expectations as to 
what extent Lending Officers should be either conducting a full review 
of a referred Loan Application or reviewing the discrete component 
which was the reason for referral.  The expectations should be clearly 
defined in the performance management contract. 
Interviewees reported that there needed to be a completeness of review, 
with any issues being raised, as there was a discrepancy otherwise if a 
loan was referred to a more senior authority for review.  A 
representative   comment   was   “You   are   approving   outside   the   CAD,  
however, given that the information was submitted by the Branch, then 
its got to be correct….The  senior  credit  authority  would  have  you  for  
breakfast.  Chew  you  up  and  spit  you  out”. 
Overall, this was an emotional issue, with Lending Officers arguing 
that the only way to obtain quality in their credit analysis was a full 
review of the file.  Representative  comments  include:    “It’s  very  hard  to  
switch off the do-the right-thing-attitude to get-through-the-workload 
attitude”   and   “On  one   hand  we’re   doing   things  wrong  because  we’re  
checking   things  we   shouldn’t   be   checking,   but   on   the   other   hand  we  
aren’t   …   I   have   a   quick   look   through   the   connection   details   …I  
basically know a lot of what the common errors are and I give a quick 
once  over  to  how  they’ve  loaded  up  the  application  ….  Nine  times  out  
of  time  there’s  something  wrong  with  it”. 
Intermediaries Intermediaries (originators) should be controlled. 
Good policy Good,  consistent  policy  is  required.    A  representative  comment  was    “a  
loan that had been approved on 10th February, if it was resubmitted on 
the 12th February, it could be declined by the system”. 
Managers setting credit policy should focus on the market, to identify 
and factor in trends in the market.  
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Policies and practices 
support writing good 
business 
Interviewees commented that Lending Officers should be comfortable 
that the policies and processes support them writing good quality 
business.   
A couple of interviewees stated that they felt there was a conflict 
between the current practices and what they felt were correct practices.  
The interviewees reported that, where possible, they tended to follow 
the  latter,  “so  they  could  sleep  well  at  night” 
There appears to be a transition issue with the more traditional style 
lenders as the lending process becomes more automated.  The 
frequently reported system and data integrity-related issues did not 
increase   the  Lending  Officers’  confidence   that   the  automated  process  
could be relied upon to provide a quality decision.  
Number of staff The appropriate level of staffing is required to handle the volumes, 
both within Lending Operations and in the Branches. 
Mortgage is low risk 
lending 
Several interviewees commented that lending against residentail 
mortgages is comparatively low risk business, and the policy and 
process should reflect this.   
Customer focus Generally, interviewees reported that customer satisfaction needs to be 
managed, with the centralisation of processing meaning that customers 
are not getting the personalised attention from Branch Managers.   
It was reported that the focus on cross-selling more product should also 
be managed.  A representative comment was that customers should not 
be  inundated  with  the  aggressive  selling  of  products  “which  they  didn’t  
need”.   
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Interaction between 
Lending Officers and 
with Senior Lending 
Officers 
Discussion between Lending Officers is required to understand and 
apply policy, leading to consistency.   A representative comment was 
“we  would  bounce  ideas  off  each  other  here,  so  we  work  collectively” 
In addition, it was reported that Lending Officers should have the time 
and the right to access to senior lending authorities, to obtain feedback 
on the appropriate way to interpret policy. 
Systems All loans held by the borrowers should be included in the loan 
assessment, thus the system should incorporate all relationships. 
The system should be updated immediately to reflect policies.  It  
should  be  “user-friendly”. 
A  representative  comment  was  “the  system  has  got  to  be  able  to  take  all  
that information and consider it all.  So that the assessors can trust, 
which  I  think  is  an  important  word,  trust  the  information  that’s  coming  
in,  so  they  don’t  have  to  go  and  check  them  all  the  time” 
Generally,   it   was   reported   that   “the   system”  was   inadequate,   out   of  
date, and not tailored to the  Bank’s  requirements. 
Data integrity / 
quality control 
Consistent with issues raised in relation to the Branches, participants 
reported that there should be an adequate level of checking of data 
integrity and quality control. 
Communication Communication was reported by all interviewees, in one guise or 
another, as being a critical requirement.  Of particular importance was 
the immediate communication of policy changes (both formal, written 
policy and its more informal interpretation) and what is expected of 
Lending Officers. 
Good management Good  management  is  a  generic  issue.    Generally,  a  “good  management  
style”  is  required. 
Consistent drivers Sales and credit teams should work together towards a common goal, 
rather than having conflicting drivers. 
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Question:    “What  drives  the  easing  or  tightening  of  credit  standards” 
Most  respondents  reported  that  the  primary  factor  driving  the  relative  “tightness”  of  credit  standards  
was the need to build market share, with a strong focus on campaigns and advertising.   
Another major factor was the drive to improve efficiency and productivity.  A representative comment 
was  “Mostly  volumes  because  the  quality  is  difficult  to  monitor”     
Other factors mentioned, to a lesser degree, were: 
 The level of bad debt / accounts hitting collections 
 The focus on shareholder value, with shareholders demanding high returns 
 Peer  pressure  from  Branches,  whose  “performance  related  solely  now  on  sales” 
 Peer pressure - “sort  of  an  attitude  within  the  Centre”.     
 
Question:     “What  actually  changes  when  the  credit  risk  attitude  changes?     How  do  you  know  
what the credit risk attitude is at a point in time and what you are meant to be 
approving/declining?” 
Responses to the question focused on the changes in policy, in terms of:  
 Formal policy changes, included in the lending policy instruction manual and memos 
 Changes of emphasis, or subtle changes of rules,  within the policy   
 Interpretation of verbal messages from management relating to policy, with team meetings being 
the main forum 
In addition, feedback on how policy was being interpreted by senior credit authorities was obtained 
when: 
 Loans were referred for a higher approval 
 A  query  regarding  policy,  or  the  interpretation  thereof,  was  made  “up  the  line”. 
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Further,  the  “system”,  or  the  rules  by  which  the  system  processed  loans,  was  reported  to  show  whether  
management was tightening or easing credit standards.   
Finally, feedback from external factors, primarily the economic environment, was incorporated by 
Lending Officers in identifying how they were meant to review loans. 
 
Question:    “Compared  to  other  points  in  time  in  the  credit  cycle,  what  is  the  credit  risk  attitude  
at  the  moment?” 
Overall, it was reported strongly that policies were looser and the Bank was aggressively chasing 
market  share.    Representative  comments  were  “they’ve  also  relaxed  the  guidelines  and  you  see  some  
tragedies  getting  through”  and  “…we’re  here  to  right  business  and  not  to  knock  it  back.    Now  unless 
it’s  a  dead  duck,  for  whatever  reasons,  we  should  be  trying  to  find  a  way  to  manipulate,  for  want  of  a  
better  word,  that  application  into  something  that  we  can”. 
The focus on the need to process high volumes of loan applications (as compared to a focus on 
quality) was also highlighted.  
However, when asked if a downturn in the economy would result in problems like those experienced 
in the late eighties, it was felt that there were some mitigating factors.  
 Decentralisation was seen to provide a greater level of control.  A representative comment was 
“Centralisation  has   lead   to   consistency;;  before  you  had   the  branch  managers  out   and   they  were  
doing  their  own  thing”. 
 The experience of the problems in the early eighties lead to learnings which would help prevent 
problems of the same magnitude recurring.  
 
A  comment  which  is  representative  of  the  overall  responses  by  interviewees  was  “Somebody  made  the  
point  not  so  long  ago  that  we’re  writing  all  this  business  now,  and  the  system  has  become  more  
automated, well  out  job  is  ultimately,  we  will  be  transferred  from  assessment  into  collections”.
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Question:     “What  are  the  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management  (relating  to  both  policies  and  
operational practices) which must be in place to build  a  good  quality  loan  portfolio?” 
Lending Officers were not asked to rank their perception of how well the current processes and 
practices within Bank B met these key aspects.  However, the issues raised highlight the areas which 
management should ensure  are  in  place,  from  the  Lending  Officers’  perspective.    A  word  of  warning:    
As I did not specifically ask Lending Officers to rate their satisfaction with the key aspects, this is my 
perception only of the key issues, based on limited information. 
Topic Description 
Balancing the sales/ 
marketing objectives 
Common objectives are required between sales and credit. 
Sales/marketing and credit need to communicate well, and to think in 
terms of company profitability. 
Balanced representation between sales and credit administration is 
required, through the risk policy committee. 
Indicative comments were:      “Like   we   aren’t   servicing   the   same  
people” and “The  culture  of   the  Bank   is   ...  you’ve  got   to   fight  to  win  
every battle. 
Customer retention 
versus new sales 
Retention activity should include a retention team: 
 With adequate staffing 
 Who can make their own decisions 
 Whose performance is not driven by numbers-based MIS 
 With enough time to talk to customers and pursue cross sell 
opportunities 
 With commission based on dollars retained rather than 
numbers. 
An indicative comment was  “service and sales are different issues.  
What we do at the moment is purely (sales) turnaround.” 
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Topic Description 
Consistent policies 
and practices 
Policies  should: 
 Be clear, comprehensive, precise, and well-detailed 
 Not be open to interpretation or have grey areas.  They should 
“define  what  policies  can  be  flexible  and  which  ones  can’t” 
 Explain what / why they are (that is, the reason for the policy) 
 Be able to be understood by the sales force  
 Be in line with, and reflect changes in, the market place. 
Policies should be applied consistently between: 
 Different authority levels, with an indicative comment being 
“some  of  the  credit  officers  have  got  into  the  habit of thinking 
if  I  don’t  sign  the  loan,  somebody  higher  will” 
 Between credit officers 
 Between sources/channels. 
Marginal applications should be declined, as it is not worth the time 
spent  in  arguing  the  applications’  merits  between  sales  and  credit. 
Introducer 
management 
Loan applicants should not have a greater probability of being 
approved if referred through an introducer than through a direct 
application. This could result from the introducers being more likely to: 
 Know  how  to  “put  up  a  deal” 
 Seek a higher authority override for a declined application. 
Introducers should have ownership of what they do and provide 
applications with integrity of information. 
The value of the introducer channel to new sales should not outweigh 
prudent underwriting practices. 
Credit basics Common sense is required. 
The credit basics of how to assess a loan (such as property location and 
capacity testing) are critical. 
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Topic Description 
Credit scoring 
system 
A Cards credit score should: 
 Be up to date  
 Be constant, and not changed for different campaigns to write 
more (poorer quality) business 
 Not be too much of a black box.  Credit officers should have 
sufficient knowledge of the scorecard to provide customers 
with at least an indication of why their application was 
declined. 
System The systems should be available to staff as required. 
One interviewee commented that there should be “More  automation  of  
the actual assessment process so that the individual credit officers 
don’t  have  to  know  volumes  of  credit  policies  inside  and  out”. 
Communication Good communication should exist: 
 Two ways (up and down the organisational levels) 
 Between sales and credit. 
Lending  Officers  need  to  understand  the  big  picture  as  to  “why  things  
are  done”. 
Marketing / credit 
strategies 
There should be a clearly defined target market, which is adhered to in 
all marketing efforts. 
There should be benchmarking of other financial institutions. 
Sales management Sales  managers  should  tell  the  sales  force  “what  is  going  on”. 
The sales force should be adequately trained. 
The sales staff reward structure: 
 should not be too highly commissioned and should have a large 
base and low commission 
 should reflect servicing of existing customers as well as new 
sales business. 
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Topic Description 
Tools/empowerment 
to do the job 
Staff should be empowered to make decisions, without unnecessary 
bureaucracy. 
The physical infrastructure should be provided in a timely manner 
without excessive bureaucracy, including: 
 Stationery 
 Computers, telephones 
 Credit Reference Association of Australia access. 
Credit authorities Credit authorities should be provided in an appropriate and timely 
manner. 
Training / experience 
of credit staff 
Thorough training of credit staff should be provided, and not foregone 
to focus on process volumes. 
Training should be provided upon commencement within a Bank 
Lending role and on an ongoing basis. 
Experience of credit staff is a critical factor. 
Staff management An appropriate performance management process should be in place, 
including a performance measurement and reward structure. 
Staff should not be given an excessive work load based (primarily) on 
MIS, which would result in staff burnout and high turnover. 
Recognition awards are required for credit staff.  An indicative 
comment was “the   person   will   want   to   feel   more   important   to   the  
overall performance of the company.  And want to be recognised for 
their  efforts.” 
Compensation should match performance rankings. 
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Question:    “What  drives  the  easing  or  tightening  of  credit  standards?” 
Lending Officers stated that the primary factor which drives the easing or tightening or credit 
standards is the desire for new business, incorporating factors such as: 
 Fighting for new sales to increase market share  
 Push for new business, which can be processed faster than existing customer business 
 Prominence /dependence on the introducer channel for new business.  An indicative comment was 
“The  introducers  run  the  bank”. 
Lending Officers also highlighted conflict between sales and credit administration.  An indicative 
comment was:  “It  does  really  feel  sometimes,  that  it’s  a  major  battle,  when  it  really  shouldn’t  be  at  
all”. 
Question:     “What  actually  changes  when  the  credit  risk  attitude   changes?  How do you know 
what the credit risk attitude is at a point in time and what you are meant to be 
approving/declining?” 
Lending Officers reported mechanisms which were both formal and informal.   
Indicative comments relating to formal factors were:  “suddenly  a  major  sales  drive,  and  suddenly  all  
the   tight,   clear   and   concise   controls   are   suddenly   put   aside   and   it’s   all   sales   orientated” and  
“Change  in  the  policy  to  get  numbers  through  the  door.” 
In addition, Lending Officers commented on less formal, intangible factors.  There was “pressure  
from   up   top” (passed on through the line managers) and pressure from sales staff.  An indicative 
comment was:  “But  instead  we  get  the  attitude,  or  feeling  perhaps  alright  fine,   the  rules  have  been  
laid down in black  and  white,  now  we’ll  just  suit  ourselves  try  and  manoeuvre  around  it.    And  I  think  
that  culture  has  always  been  within   this  organisation”   and “when   they  meet   their   targets,   it   comes  
down   from   everywhere,   it   doesn’t   matter,   just   process   it   quickly,   might get heaps more done, you 
might  do  one  bad  one,  but…”. 
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Question:    “Compared  to  other  points  in  time  in  the  credit  cycle,  what  is  the  credit  risk  attitude  
at  the  moment?” 
There was a very strong perception that there was an “Obvious  dominance  of  the  salesforce”,  and 
“99.9%  of  the  time  sales  will  win  if  they  keep  pushing”. 
A  focus  on  market  share  was  reported.    Indicative  comments  were:    “The Bank has moved from a very 
tight credit policy, to very much a looser credit policy to achieve  market  share”. 
Overall,  policies  were  perceived  to  be  “looser”.    An  indicative  comment  was  “Policy has loosened, 
basically  to  get  numbers  in”.  Exceptions to the overall trend were: 
 Cards  were  perceived  to  be  “a  bit  tighter  than  a  few  years  ago”   
 Capacity income testing had been introduced, although it was reported to be the weakest capacity 
testing of any of the banks. 
However, there was a perception that policies were too tight for existing customers in both Mortgages 
and Cards.  It was argued that this reflected the new sales orientation, rather than the servicing of 
existing customers. 
There also was a perception that the credit risk attitude was being affected by volume, or process 
efficiency, requirements.  An indicative comments was:  “I  guess  from a new business perspective, 
yeah,  it’s  push,  push,  push,  to  get,  I  guess,  it  approved  quickly.    If  possible  to  get  it  settled,  to  get  it  on  
the  books,  as  soon  as  possible.    Yeah,  and  I  guess  I’m  taking,  I’m  cutting  some  corners..”. 
Finally, there appeared to be some concerns with the quality of new business.   Indicative comments 
were:  “big  push  to  get  business  through  the  door,  not  having  the  best  business  coming  through  the  
door”  and “It’s  campaign  based,  but  they’re  not  using  their  target  market  as a base for the campaign.  
They’re  simply  going  out  to  the  general  public”.    There  was  reference  made  to  poor  quality  securities,  
with a comment being made that Bank valuers had indicated that Bank was writing business in areas 
other institutions would not. 
 
Bibliography and Appendices: Appendix 7 Page 86 
Bank C Lending Officers 
 
Question:     “What  are  the  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management  (relating  to  both  policies  and  
operational  practices)  which  must  be  in  place  to  build  a  good  quality  loan  portfolio?” 
Lending Officers were not asked to rank their perception of how well the current processes and 
practices within the Bank met these key aspects.  However, the issues raised highlight the areas which 
management  should  ensure  are  in  place,  from  the  Lending  Officers’  perspective.     
Topic Description 
Focus on profit 
versus volume 
There should be a focus on writing profitable business, rather than 
simply building market share.   
Lenders and credit officers need a profit indicator to know what the 
profit actually is per loan. 
Credit strategies The Bank should know what it wants in the lending portfolio, and have 
clear policies to support this. 
Credit policies should reflect market conditions, that is, the 
competitors’  credit  standards. 
To reflect segment risk properly, detailed and up-to-date information is 
required.  
Clear policies and 
procedures 
Policies and procedures should: 
 Be clear, not ambiguous, concise, in plain English and user-
friendly 
 Be documented in separate Policy and Procedure manuals 
 Be shown in the same policy document for all user groups, 
with only minor exceptions to reflect differences in the groups 
 Be written to accommodate both new and experienced lenders. 
Awareness of the 
credit cycle 
Senior Management should incorporate lessons learnt from prior 
business cycles when establishing the current policies and practices.  
An indicative comment was “you   hoped   sometimes   that   people   who  
have lived through that particular period of time are still around to see 
the flows, the ups and downs”. 
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Topic Description 
Good 
communication 
A retail credit management meeting (including Product, Group Credit 
and Head of Retail) can work well to prevent the credit policy makers 
“Loosing  touch  with  the  real  world”. 
Good two-way communication is needed between field staff, credit 
officers and Group Credit, to highlight changes in the lending market 
and credit policies. 
Good communication is required to overcome specialisation of 
different parts of the lending process into various operational areas 
(loan application sourcing, origination, settlement and collections). 
Good communication with Team leaders is essential. 
Systems Technology should support the lending process as staff are “beholden  
to what the Bank gives them”.    Systems  should: 
 Provide   access   to   other   products’   systems.      An   indicative 
comment   was:   “Of   course   if   they’ve   got   credit   with   us,   we  
need to check it and check it thoroughly and be able to 
understand  what  we’re  reading.    It  needs  to  be  clear  and  easy  to  
access.” 
 Be easy and quick to use  
 Provide good telephone system/process to manage incoming 
calls, so customers do not have to wait too long 
 Keep   up  with   the   pace   of   lending.     The   systems   “need   to   be  
flexible  to  match  what  the  market  place  comes  out  with”. 
Generally, systems were of much greater importance to the Unsecured 
Credit Officers than the Secured Credit Officers, probably reflecting 
the high level of automation in the Unsecured area. 
Credit scoring 
system 
Autodecisioning requires good data to be input – “rubbish  in,  rubbish  
out”. 
In the Unsecured area, the credit scoring system can lead to a better 
decision  than  a  judgemental  review  “Because the system is in place to 
look  at  everything”. 
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Topic Description 
Credit authorities Credit authorities should be carefully managed.  “There  is  a   trade-off 
between giving lending officers a bigger authority (credit risk) versus 
turnaround time.  Need to be elective in who give the higher credit 
authority  to” 
The Credit Officer should lose their credit authority if an error is 
“bad”.  That is, disciplinary action should be taken if staff act outside 
of credit policy.  
Overrides process A straightforward process is required for override reviews. 
Lending Officers should be given feedback as to the approve/decline 
decision on the loans they refer to a higher authority. 
Quality control Good  quality  controls  should  identify  if  staff  “step outside the rules”.   
The Quality Review process should be tailored, such that the more 
experienced (capable) Credit Officers do not receive the same intensity 
of review as the less experienced (capable) Credit Officers. 
Standardised process A standardised process should be in place to assist consistency of 
decision making.  An indicative comment in the Unsecured area was: 
“Well  you  get   training  before  you  start  over  four weeks, and because 
you’re   doing   the   same   applications,   we   do   VISA   cards   and   personal  
loans  and   things,   and   it’s   the   same  process  over  and  over,   so   you’re  
just getting different customers all the time, but the process is exactly 
the  same  way.” 
 
Bibliography and Appendices: Appendix 7 Page 89 
Bank C Lending Officers 
 
 
Topic Description 
Customer interface A good client interview process is required, largely to offset the 
removal of the traditional Branch Manager / customer relationship.  
The process should: 
 Obtain appropriate information. 
 Maintain contact with customer 
 Identify  problems  early.    An  indicative  comment  was:  “I  mean  
you got people who would speak to you if they were in strife, 
whereas  now,  they  don’t  speak  to  you,  they  hide”. 
Customer ownership should be managed well, given the number of 
different areas involved in the lending process.  An indicative comment 
was: 
“the  lender  in  the  field  will  do  the  loan  and  run  to  the  next  one,  and  
forget  about  that  particular  client.    So  there’s  no  ownership  of  the  
particular  work  that  you’re  doing.    And  I  think  that  if  there’s  no  
ownership,  there’s  no  care.” 
Sell the right product Lenders should sell the right product to the customer: 
 Lenders need to know what the customers want to be able to 
match the product functionality.  For example, they should not 
be sold a revolving line of credit if they really just want to pay 
off a loan in regular instalments. 
Sales performance 
rewards 
The   sales   force’s   performance   reward   structure.      An   indicative  
comment was: “to   get   that   bonus   mentality   out   of   the   equation,  
because  you’re  only  doing  a   loan  because   it  means  dollars   to  you  …  
people  wouldn’t  just  concentrate  on  writing  figures,  they’d  write  loans.    
There’s  a  bit  of  a  difference  there.” 
The commission structure should not encourage the selling of an 
inappropriate product  for  the  customers’  needs. 
Commission should be based on the loan being settled, rather than the 
loan application being approved. 
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Topic Description 
Well informed 
mobile lenders 
Training for mobile lenders needs to: 
 Be meaningful, good quality and concise 
 Allow for the fact that the sales force are not lenders  
 Focus on communicating with customers, as most complaints 
are not about the credit decision, but the appropriate 
communication.   
Field staff need to know if the loan application is worthwhile (that is, 
justifies raising a loan application). 
The process should ensure that mobile lenders get the all the 
information and documentation up front. 
Field staff should have a strong work ethic. 
Training for credit 
staff 
Training for credit staff needs to be excellent.  Training should include 
both  formal  classroom  training  and  the  “buddy  system”  (sitting  next  to  
someone on the job).   
Training  should  be  consistent,  regardless  of  the  “buddy”  allocated. 
Career paths  Career paths should be actively managed in accordance with different 
career   aspirations.      For   example,   Cards’   staff   comments   varied   from  
“It’s   quite   repetitive.      So   I’m  hoping   to  move  on.”   to   “I   love   it…well  
retail, I enjoy talking to people, and different people all the time, 
you’re  learning  new  things”. 
Flexible working 
conditions 
Flexible working hours should be accomodated.   It may be necessary 
to modify training and other communication mechanisms for the part-
time staff. 
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Topic Description 
Performance 
management 
Incentive targets should be established for each individual, over and 
above  the  group’s  average  or  benchmark  target.   
Small awards such as movie tickets can be well received. 
Regular MIS should show how the credit officer has performed, 
including both the quality and quantity of work undertaken.  
Credit Officers needs collections exposure and feedback on the 
performance of the portfolio which they approved initially. 
Appropriate performance expectations should be set given the type of 
lending undertaken.  The probability of default on a loan portfolio 
could vary due to the inherent risk of the portfolio, rather than the 
Credit   Officers’   decisions.      An   indicative   comment   was:  “Because  
they’re   outside   the   normal   lenders   guidelines, so I get the ticklish 
ones”. 
Credit Officers should be able to learn from experience without  fear of 
punishment.  There are elements that the Credit Officer has no control 
over, such as  marital breakups and loss of income through business 
failure, job loss and sickness.  An indicative comment was:  “Also   I  
believe that if a loan falls on bad times, for whatever reason, I think 
that the person that wrote it, not, no blame should be given”     
Personal pride in the work should be encouraged:   
“Because  you   just  have   this   loyalty   to   the  bank,  well  I  do,   I  wouldn’t  
want to just make a sale and know that that money was going to be 
spent and never repaid.” 
Credit basics “The  bottom  line  is  common  sense.” 
Credit staff should be taught the credit basics such as:  “Serviceability  
calculations are not predictive of problem loans (that is, serviceability 
and willingness to pay are separate things). 
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Question:    “What  drives  the  easing  or  tightening  of  credit  standards?” 
The primary factors mentioned by Credit Officers as driving the easing or tightening of credit 
standards included: 
 Prevailing  conditions  in  the  market,  with  an  indicative  comment  being:    “…  we  encourage  them  to  
see what the opposition is offering.  That way, you know what the  market  trend  is,  and  we  don’t  
want   to   be   at   the   top   of   the  market,   we   don’t  want   to   be   at   the   bottom.      So  we   try   and   keep  
ourselves  in  the  middle.” 
 The focus on sales, with reference to the performance reward structure of the sales force.  An 
indicative  comment  was:    “Yeah  well  you  get  paid  for  that,  and  their  boss  gets  paid  on  what  they  
do.    And  I  presume  that  he  gets  pressure  from  his  boss.” 
 Feedback from the customer base 
 Financial conditions within the Bank, such as extra funds 
 Portfolio segments identified as being potentially problematic.  An example was employment 
areas such as computing where loan applicants are employed largely on a contract basis 
 Performance measurement being based on volumes of loan applications written, with expectations 
on turnaround   times.     The  emphasis   is  unsecured  was  on   the  “strike   rate”  without   including   the  
quality of lending (with the credit scoring system playing a major role). 
Other factors mentioned were: 
 The  Bank  has  “…  grown  as  an  organisation,  and  are  trying  to  compete on level footing with the 
major  players” 
 The  Consumer  Credit  Code.    It  was  argued  that  it  was  initially  hard  to  define  “what  is  reasonable”,  
but lenders would get better with experience 
 Changes   in   borrowers   behaviour.     An   indicative   comment  was   “you look at the style of living 
nowadays,  there’s  more  marriage  breakups,  there’s  more  bankruptcies,  it  seems  to  be  the  trend”. 
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Question:     “What  actually  changes  when  the  credit  risk  attitude  changes?     How  do  you  know  
what the credit risk attitude is at a point in time and what you are meant to be 
approving/declining?”   
Formal changes in policy were noted as the primary factor reflecting changes in credit risk attitude.  
The requirement for separate, up to date policy and procedure documents were mentioned several 
times (the documents were under development at the time of the interviews).  Until they were 
available,“  there’s,  you  know,  there’s  bits  of   information  that  gets  sent  out  to  the  lenders  by  PC,  on  
their emails, just saying watch  out  for  this,  or  watch  out  for  that”. 
 Other factors related to credit policy which were highlighted were: 
 The loosening of credit policy exceptions 
 The Retail credit management meeting held between Product, Group Credit, Head of Retail 
 Feedback from the Collections manager (repossessions), group credit, product management, et 
In the Unsecured area, the feedback was nearly solely based on perceived changes to the Credit 
Scoring model.  An indicative comment was: “Credit  scores  I  suppose  have  changed  a  bit, sometimes 
they’re  a  little  bit  stricter,  sometimes,  then  like  customers  may  get  approved  on  a  situation  where,  you  
might  think,  oh  that’s  gone  through,  I  don’t  know  about  that.”  and ““we’re  not  sort  of  advised  that,  
you  know  that  there’s  restrictions  in  place  or  that,  you  know,  like  I  mean  so  there’s  nothing,  I  mean  
nothing’s  sort  of  verbalised  to  say,  well  I  suppose  that’s  not  our  area” 
In addition, interviewees commented on less formal, intangible factors such as: 
 Emphasis was placed on the need to work  as  a  “close  team,  talk  all  the  time” 
 It   was   highlighted   that   “what   is   coming   through   the   door   by   way   of   referrals”   provides   an  
indication of all of the loan applications being received 
 There   was   a   comment   that   the   “Credit   manager   said   we   should   “open   up”,   with   the   concern  
expressed that Credit Officers should not be target driven.  
The performance measures also gave an indication as to what was important to Senior Management.  
In the Secured area, there were two core measures/benchmarks which covered both volume 
(productivity) and the quality of decisions. 
In the Unsecured area, the focus clearly was on the number of calls a consultant takes, and how many 
calls are converted into a sale. An indicative comment was:  “the  main  thing  is  the  strike  rate,  where 
we  hang  out  for  the  figures  of  the  strike  rate”. 
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Question:    “Compared  to  other  points  in  time  in  the  credit  cycle,  what  is  the  credit  risk  attitude  
at  the  moment?” 
Overall, there was a perception that credit standards had been lowered.  It was reported that there was 
a focus on volume versus profit, with no understanding of what profitable business was.   
One   interviewee   commented   that   the   environment   was   “watchful”,   in   terms   of   interest   rates,  
aggressive builder developers, more rubbish deals, and extensive use of originators.  Another 
interviewee commented that credit providers generally are “being  pushed  into  doing  the  loans  that  are  
marginal”, noting that the larger banks are “big  enough  to  be  able  to  survive  that  sort  of  thing.” 
There  was  a  mixed  reaction  to  the  question  whether  current  lending  practices  were  “as  bad  as  the  
1980’s  excesses”.      Arguments  against  the  same  problems  re-occurring included: 
 
 A benchmark rate is now used to guard against interest rate shock, liabilities, and so on 
 Means and measures of looking at income are more sophisticated, for example, using gross 
income less tax, taking into account negative gearing, living allowance and overtime policy, etc. 
 The Bank is more aware of possible issues, having learnt from the prior period.  An indicative 
comment   relating   to   inner  city  apartments  was:     “Say   if   the  similar   situation  happened  10  years  
ago  …  they  would  just  go  bang  and  lend  against  it  at  a  higher  rate,  now  you’re  probably  a  bit  more  
aware that there could  be  a  possible  problem  somewhere.” 
 The Consumer Credit Code has had a good effect 
 The sales force is reasonably sophisticated. 
 
Conversely, the arguments as to why the current lending practices could lead to a situation as bad as 
the 1980s included: 
 
 The  chasing  of  market  share.    Indicative  comments  include:    “now  I  think  we’re  in  a  pre  87  mode,  
I  believe  all  banks  are  obviously  trying  to  maintain  their  market  share.    So  they’re  maybe  diluting  
their   credit   requirements   so   they’ve   got   to   maintain   a   balance, but obviously for the running 
figures, your market share, your bonuses, whatever it is, of course things have been put on you to 
change.”  and  “it  only  needs  a  couple  of  players  in  the  field   that,  because   they’re  not  getting   the  
cream of the business, they’ll  chase  the  risky.    So  it  just  creates  a  domino  effect.” 
 Loss   of   experienced   Senior   Credit   Managers.      An   indicative   comment   was   “with   the   Banks’  
program  of  restructuring  or  retrenching,  ..  there’s  not  many  of  them  around” 
 Whilst policies have been put in place to protect against excessive lending, the policies may not be 
sufficient.  For example, the benchmark rate was argued to be too low because it is driven by the 
market as compared to prudential internal standards 
 People have borrowed up to the hilt due to the increased availability of credit. 
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8 Comparison of Individual versus Focus Group interviews in Bank 
A (summary) 
This Appendix provides a summary of the individual and focus group interviews in Bank A - the only 
Bank in which it was necessary to conduct both individual and focus group interviews. 
 
Question:    “What  drives  the  credit  risk  attitude”: 
 
Cards individual vs. Cards focus 
group  
 Individual: Highlighted the customer focus; Effect of prior 
learning 
 Focus group:  Branch push sales.   
Mortgage individual vs. 
Mortgage focus groups 
 Nil report 
Mortgage combined (individual 
and focus groups interviews) vs. 
Cards combined 
 Cards:    Customer  focus;;  Effect  of  prior  learning;;  “Don’t  get  
a  reason,  just  do  it” 
 Mortgage:  Focus on shareholder value 
Focus groups combined 
(Mortgage and Cards) vs. 
individual interviews combined 
 Nil report 
Mentioned in only one of the 
four groups (Mortgage focus 
group, Mortgage individual, 
Cards focus group, Card 
individual) 
 Cards focus group:  Recession where  people just don’t  want  
to lend money 
 
Question:    “How  do  you  know  what  the  credit  risk  attitude  is  at  a  point  in  time?    What  are  you  
meant  to  do?”  and  “What  actually  changes  when  the  credit  risk  attitude  changes”: 
Cards individual vs. Cards focus 
group  
 Individual:  Outside things such as media; 
Mortgage individual vs. 
Mortgage focus groups 
 Focus group:  Team meeting; your own perceptions and 
outside things such as media; Performance management; 
quality control 
 Individual:  More  customer focused 
Mortgage combined (individual 
and focus groups interviews) vs. 
Cards combined 
 Cards:  Campaign policy (reflects the large, ad hoc 
campaigns); emphasis on scorecard, approvals / declinals, 
hindsighting.    
 Mortgage:  Feedback from higher credit authority, 
interactions on marginal cases, etc. 
Focus groups combined 
(Mortgage and Cards) vs. 
individual interviews combined 
 Individual:  More customer focused 
Mentioned in only one of the 
four groups  
 Cards individual:  Centralised credit with volume focus  
 Mortgage focus group:  Harassing customers with cross sell 
(although Cards did refer to excessive credit being offered to 
customers) 
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Question:    “What  is  the  state  of  the  credit  risk  attitude  now?” 
 
 The Mortgage individual and focus groups interviewees were unanimous in arguing that 
policies were looser, with a focus on volumes-processed  and  growing  the  market  share.  “We’re  
here  to  write  business,  not  knock  it  back”  was  an  indicative  comment. 
 The Cards responses were not unanimous, although the majority of interviewees reported that 
policies had eased.  The focus group vehemently stated that the focus was on quantity not 
quality, speed of processing, and excessive amount of credit offered.  The individual interviews 
generally stated that policies and practices were less stringent, although one interviewee was at 
the   opposite   end   of   the   spectrum:   “We’re   not   being   pressured   so  we’re   being   very   strict   on  
them.    We’re  sticking  to  policy.    So  there’s  not  a  lot  of  flexibility  there”.     
 
Question:    “The  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management (relating to both policies and operational 
practices)  the  Bank  must  have  in  place  to  book  good  quality  loan  applications  include…”:   
 
Cards individual vs. Cards focus 
group  
 Cards individual:  Assessors with sound lending knowledge 
and experience;  Data integrity / quality control of 
information;  Good, accessible managers;  Common drivers 
between areas ie credit policy, marketing, operations work 
together 
 Cards focus group:  Nil report 
Mortgage individual vs. 
Mortgage focus groups 
 Mortgage individual:  Feed off other areas; Centralisation; 
Good, accessible managers; sales and credit work together; 
morality – write good business and sleep at night;  Assessors 
with sound lending knowledge and experience 
 Mortgage focus group:   Written confirmation in 
performance management document whether want credit 
quality or quantity; intermediaries 
Mortgage combined (individual 
and focus groups interviews) vs. 
Cards combined 
 Cards combined:  Intent of policy / understand big picture;  
scoring and automation  
 Mortgage combined:  Branch / retail network accuracy of 
information   and   not   take   the   customers’   side;;      additional  
security of mortgages changes credit risk profile; end to end 
review of loans; referrals up the line 
Focus groups combined 
(Mortgage and Cards) vs. 
individual interviews combined 
 Individual interview:  Common drivers between areas ie 
credit policy, marketing, operations work together;  good, 
accessible management style; assessors with sound lending 
knowledge and experience 
 Focus group interview:  Nil report 
Mentioned in only one of the 
four groups  
 Cards individual: Intent of policy and understand the big 
picture; Awareness of the credit cycle 
 Cards focus group:  Nil  
 Mortgage individual:  Working up through the ranks; 
customer satisfaction has decreased;  lenders should feel that 
they are important assets to the Bank;  feedback on loans the 
lending officer has written 
 Mortgage focus group: Different amount of work if referred 
for a higher authority; intermediaries;   Customers should be 
told what bring in to make an application; Mortgage insurer 
and Bank policies align 
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9 Bank A - Detailed Comparison of Individual versus Focus Group 
Interviews 
This Appendix provides a more detailed coding of the individual and focus group interviews in Bank A 
- the only Bank in which it was necessary to conduct both individual and focus group interviews.  
 
Question:  What drives the tightening / easing of credit standards? 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Size of book – need to build 1 4 3 2 
Competition, advertising in the market 5 4  2 
Campaigns – ie what being advertised at the 
time 
2 2 2  
Branches push sales 1  1  
Source driven – campaign, originator pressure  2 1 1 
Customer focus by bank  1   
Customer attitudes / feedback  2   
One stop shop – relationship building 1    
Internal factors – policies, management, staff  1   
Productivity / increased turnover 2 2 1 2 
Hitting collections / bad debt  1 1 2 
Recession – losses within the Bank  2   
Recession – people just don’t  want  to  borrow  
money 
 1   
Learning from last campaign  1   
Tax benefits (losses off balance sheet; 
operating costs on balance sheet) 
1    
Monitoring policy by reserve bank  1   
Don’t  get  a  reason  – just do it 1 1   
Lower interest rates   1  
Focus on shareholder value   1 1 
Business environment (reaction to)    1 
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Question:  What actually changes when the credit risk attitude changes? 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Reduced # checks, to improve volume flow 1    
Approval / declinal rate 1    
Justify a decline and not justify an approval 1    
Focus on achieving targets  1   
Policy changes  2  2 
Policy changes for a campaign  1   
Interpretation of policy  1   
Hindsighting for a campaign  2   
More customer focused  1   
Point scoring / scoring fields  1   
Systems changes  2   
Performance management contracts  1   
Depends  if  manager  “tough”  or  “softie”  1   
Policy – from collateral focus to servicing 
focus 
   1 
Criteria same – emphasis changes    1 
Quality control    1 
Lending  officer’s  interactions  on  marginal  
cases 
   1 
Not worried about increasing concentrations 
eg. particular type of industry 
  1  
“Harassing  customers  with  cross  sell”   1  
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Question:  How do you know what the credit risk attitude is at a point in time?  What are you 
meant to do? 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Team meeting 1 1 1  
Management –verbally 1 2 1 2 
Your own perceptions – optimistic time or not 1    
Your own perceptions as a whole – ie not one 
specific thing 
  1  
Outside things eg. media  1   
Staff attitude  1   
Numbers driven 1 2 1  
Campaign policy 1 3   
Feel from branches  1 1  
Policy rules  2 1 3 
# guidelines / checks decreased  2  1 
Hindsighting policy 1 2   
Manual reviews versus automated  1   
Approvals versus declinals  3   
Know if scorecard is tight or lenient (product 
being pushed) 
1  1  
Computer system  1 1 1 
Centralised credit with volume focus  1   
# complaints from customers 1 1 1  
Performance management / KRAs 1    
See going into re-instatements (ie credit 
problems) 
1  1  
Nothing specific – directive from upstairs  2   
“Sense”  from  management  eg  “have  to  have  a  
good  reason  to  decline” 
  1  
Status of the book - “if  the  book  is  good,  go  
for it” 
  1  
Feedback when account is re-assessed because 
branch complained 
  1  
Feedback when have to refer to higher credit 
authority 
  1  
Raise up the line when have a query re. policy 
interpretation from Credit Dept 
   3 
Feedback from Market (eg media)    1 
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Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Subtle changes in rules rather than broad 
policy changes 
  1 1 
 
When the two questions were combined (due to the overlap in responses): 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
Focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Team meeting 1 1 1  
Management – verbally 1 2 1 2 
Your own perceptions – optimistic time or not;  
staff attitude; not one specific thing 
1 1 1  
Outside things eg. media  1  1 
Numbers driven; targets 1 2,1 1  
Campaign policy 1 3   
“Harassing  customers  with  cross  sell”   1  
Feel from branches  1 1  
Policy rules  2 1 3 
Not worried about increasing concentrations 
eg. particular type of industry (part of policy) 
  1  
# guidelines / checks decreased 1 2  1 
Hindsighting policy; Justify a decline and not 
justify an approval; Manual reviews versus 
automated 
1,1 2,1   
Approvals versus declinals 1 3   
Know if scorecard is tight or lenient (product 
being pushed);  point score; systems changes 
1 3 1  
Computer system  1 1 1 
Centralised credit with volume focus  1   
# complaints from customers 1 1 1  
More customer focused;;  From collateral 
focus to servicing focus 
 1  1 
Performance management / KRAs;  should 
explicitly state what level of review the 
Mortgage Officer should conduct 
1 1 1  
See going into re-instatements (ie credit 
problems); Status of the book - “if  the  book  is  
good,  go  for  it” 
1  1  
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Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
Focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Nothing specific – directive from upstairs; 
“Sense”  from  management  eg  “have  to  have  a  
good  reason  to  decline” 
 2 1  
Feedback when have to refer to higher credit 
authority; Feedback when account is re-
assessed because branch complained;  Lending 
officer’s  interactions  on  marginal  cases;;  Raise  
up the line when have a query re. policy 
interpretation from Credit Dept 
  1,1 1,3 
Interpretation of policy; subtle changes in 
rules rather than broad policy changes; Criteria 
same – emphasis changes;   
 1 1,1  1 
Depends  if  manager  “tough”  or  “softie”  1   
Quality control    1 
 
 
Question:  What is the state of the credit risk attitude now? 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Looser policies   1  
We’re  here  to  write  business,  not  knock  it  
back 
  1  
Numbers driven – quantity not quality    2 
Aggressively chasing market share    2 
“We’re  not  being  pressures  so  we’re  being  
very  strict  on  them.    We’re  sticking  to  policy.    
So  there’s  not  a  lot  of  flexibility  there” 
 1   
“The  Bank’s  …  got  the  culture.    We  want  to  
do the deal all the time, and rather than try and 
find  they  reason  for  declining  it,  they’re  
finding a reason to approve it.  Or help the 
loan  through” 
 2   
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Question:  Will  it  be  as  bad  as  the  1980’s? 
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
More experience now – in  1980s,  hadn’t  had  a  
negative profit experience, high interest rates, 
did have sales push 
  1 1 
Yes   1 3 
Loose policies, but mitigating factors   1 1 
Looser policies    2 
No    2 
Before decentralised, so hard to control 
standardisation.  Now is centralised 
  1 1 
Bit of both, in terms of tightness of policies    1 
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Question:    “The  key  aspects  of  credit  risk  management  (relating  to  both  policies  and  operational  
practices) the Bank must have in place to book good quality  loan  applications  include…”:   
 
Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Working up through the ranks    1 
Perception of the economy/market;  reading    1 
Discussion between lending areas    11 
Referrals up the line    1 
# staff to volumes    1 
Credit policy    1 
Written guidelines 11 1111   
Stable and consistent lending policy,  decision 1 111   
Good policy  1   
Stable policy     
Information – understand the big picture;  
intent of policy 
 11   
Personal training / inherent ability    11 
Assessors with sound lending knowledge and 
experience 
 1111   
Career path;  have specialised; have lost credit 
skills 
  1 111 
Training for credit people  111 1 11111 
Support / on the job training from co-workers / 
feed off other areas 
 111  11 
Enough staff to do the job    1 
Education    11 
Performance management  11   
Branch/retail network – correct data input (ie 
don’t  lie) 
  1 111 
Branch – training   1 1 
Branch – disciplinary action if get wrong    1 
Branch – sufficient staff to handle volume  of 
work (given variety of tasks) 
  1  
Branch – deliberately falsify information   1  
Branch (or whoever inputs) should have less 
than 10% error in data entry, analysis of 
information 
  1  
Compliance testing to determine what is level 
of data error 
  1  
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Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
Focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Branch – take  the  customer’s  side  /  save  face  
eg.  “There’s  a  problem  too,  that  I  think  the  
staff  believe  the  customers  too  much” 
  1  
Branch – believe what customer tells them     
Branches push to write volume not quality   1  
Compliance testing what is going into the 
application (entered by the Branch) 
  1  
Customers should have indication of what they 
should bring in to make an application, in 
terms of information, to help Branch staff 
enter accurate information 
  1  
All products taken into account (identified via 
system) 
  1 11 
Serviceability should reflect all products held 
with the Bank 
  1  
Feedback on loans the lending officers have 
written 
   111 
Don’t  lose  credit  skills,  due  to  specialisation  in  
one area 
  11 11 
End-to-end  review  of  application  versus  “bit  
that  rejected  by  system”  ie  don’t  trust  system,  
pride in lending decision 
  1 111 
Written confirmation, in performance 
management documents, of  whether want 
“credit  quality”  focus  or  quantity  focus  (where  
apply very strict rules to parts of the 
application) 
  1  
Stable and consistent lending decision 1   1 
Different amount of work if doing through 
system or if has to be referred for a higher 
signatory 
  1  
Consistency between products 1 1   
Consistency between lenders  1   
Between credit policy and operations  1   
Managers should not expect quality of lending 
decision and quantity (volume) of processing 
  1  
Customer focus (satisfaction has decreased)    111 
Market focus – actively watch for trends     1 
Centralisation    1 (bad 
thing) 
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Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
System – check logic of data entry   1 1 
System – policies out of date   1 1 
System – correct referrals    1 
System – out of date generally;  not designed 
for the Bank 
  2 1 
System – user friendly   1  
System that works 11 1   
System matches policy 1 11   
Scoring and automation 11 111   
Scoring for existing customers as well as new 
accounts 
 1   
Staff should not go into too much assessment 
if the system has already approved/declined 
  1  
Against the above – should be able to override 
the system when it is glaringly wrong 
  1  
Boring work because system makes decisions?     
Data integrity / quality control of information  1 1 111 
Need quality control    1 
Communication (particularly of policy 
changes) 
  1 1 
2 way communication on policy.  Credit 
policy setters should understand impact on 
operations 
1 11   
Communication – what’s  expected  of  lending  
officers (closer to performance management  
contract) 
    
Communication between areas 1    
Good management style, accessible  111  1 
Support from senior management  1   
Sales and credit work together    1 
Common drivers between areas eg. credit 
policy, marketing, operations 
 11   
Additional security of mortgages changes 
credit risk profile 
  1 11 
Morality – write good business (sleep at night) 1 11  1 
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Topic area – Bank A Cards 
focus 
Cards 
1 on 1 
Mortg. 
focus 
Mortg. 
1 on 1 
Intermediaries (originators) controlled  eg. 
“There  seems  to  be  a  big  push  out  there  in  the  
introducer broker area, where, I suppose that 
comes under what Sarina was saying before, 
the branch have got branches and targets so 
they bring in all these supposed rainmakers 
who  just  haven’t  got  a  clue.    I  think  they’re  
doing  lending  for  us,  they’re  doing  
recommendations for Commonwealth Bank, 
they  have  no  form  of  allegiance.” 
  1  
Mortgage insurer and Bank policies should 
align 
  1  
Existing customers 1    
Learning from prior campaigns, periods  11   
Volume statistics  1   
Lenders should feel that they are important 
assets to the Bank 
   1 
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10     Summary of Responses from Each of the Banks (Individual and 
Focus Group Interviews Combined) 
This Chapter  shows  the  initial  version  of  the  summary  of  the  interviews  using  the  “editing”  approach,  
followed by a re-calibrated version. 
First  version  of  “edited”  codes 
Category Bank A Bank B Bank C 
Focus on profit versus volume; balancing the sales/ 
marketing objectives; consistent drivers / integration 
between areas 
x X X 
Credit and marketing/credit strategies  X X 
Clear, consistent policies and procedures/ Policies and 
practices support writing good business 
x X X 
Stable and consistent lending decisions x   
Credit basics  X X 
Awareness of the credit cycle; learning lessons x  X 
Introducer management x X  
Sales performance rewards/sales management/well 
informed mobile lenders/ Branch interface 
x X X 
Sell the right product   X 
Customer focus; customer interface; customer 
retention versus new sales 
x X X 
Good system x X X 
Credit scoring x X X 
End to end review of loans x   
Mortgage is low risk lending x   
Credit authorities  X X 
Overrides process   X 
Standardised process   X 
Quality control/data integrity x  X 
Tools/empowerment to do the job  X  
Number of staff;  statistics and volume x   
Credit staff:  Training / experience / demonstrate 
sound credit skills / development 
x X X 
Career paths   X 
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Category Bank A Bank B  Bank C 
Flexible working conditions   X 
Feedback on lending quality x   
Good communication x x X 
Performance management   X 
Support and communication between Lending Officers x   
Interaction between Lending Officers and with Senior 
Lending Officers 
x   
Staff management x x  
Integrity / morality x   
 
Revised  version  of  “edited”  codes: 
 
Category Bank A Bank B  Bank C 
Focus on profit/volume; Balancing the sales/marketing 
objectives;  credit and marketing strategies; consistent 
drivers 
X x X 
Market focus – actively watch for trends; 
benchmarking 
X x X 
Awareness of the credit cycle; learning lessons from 
prior campaigns/periods 
X  X 
Clear, consistent policies and procedures support 
writing good business 
X x X 
Intent of policy / understand big picture X x  
Stable and consistent lending decisions; Consistency 
between product areas;  all products taken into account 
(in serviceability) 
X x  
Introducer management X x  
Sales management / Branch interface / Well informed 
mobile lenders 
X x X 
Sales performance rewards, motivation X x X 
Sell the right product   X 
Customer focus; customer interface; customer 
retention versus new sales 
X x X 
Good communication X x X 
Good system X x X 
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Category Bank A Bank B  Bank C 
Credit scoring X x X 
End to end review of loans X   
Standardised process:  Assists consistency, ease of 
learning but makes less interesting and skilled 
X  X 
Mortgage is low risk lending X   
Credit authorities – appropriate, removed if negligent   x X 
Overrides process X x X 
Centralisation X   
Data integrity / quality control of information X  X 
Support and communication between Lending 
Officers, areas; Interaction between Lending Officers 
and with Senior Lending Officers 
X  X 
Tools/empowerment to do the job  x  
Integrity / morality (sleep at night) X  X 
Number of staff;  statistics and volume X x  
Credit staff:  Training / experience / demonstrate 
sound credit skills / development 
X x X 
Feedback on loans the lending officers have written X x X 
Career paths X  X 
Flexible working conditions   X 
Performance management / MIS / learn from 
experience without punishment 
X x X 
Staff management – supportive, good X  X 
Get the basics right (ie credit decisioning basics)  x X 
Consumer  credit  code.      Initially,  hard   to  define  “what  
is  reasonable”  but  lenders  get better with experience 
  X 
Processes in place to overcome the lack of relationship 
with borrower 
X x X 
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11 Edited and Categorised Responses from Each of the Banks, 
showing Individual and Focus Group Interviews Separately 
This Appendix provides a summary of responses from all Banks, with the responses to the individual 
and focus groups within each bank being shown separately. 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor1 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Focus on profit versus volume; Balancing the sales/ marketing 
objectives; Credit and marketing strategies 
     1  1 1 
Know what you want in the lending portfolio, and have clear 
policies to support this 
      1   
Balanced representation between sales and admin. (credit) 
through risk policy committee 
    1     
Sales and marketing interface.  Common objectives between 
sales  and  servicing  “Like  we  aren’t  servicing  the  same  people”.    
Sales and servicing need to communicate.  Need two way 
communication and to think in terms of company profitability 
    1     
Market focus – actively watch for trends; benchmarking    1  1   1 
 
  
                                                     
1 “Mor’  represents  Mortgage 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Clear, consistent policies and procedures support writing good 
business 
   1      
Good, stable policy 11         
Information – understand the big picture;  intent of policy  11        
Written guidelines 11 111        
Policies:  clear, comprehensive, precise, not open to 
interpretation, without grey area, which sales force can 
understand  policies;;  “define  what  policies  can  be   flexible  and  
which  one’s  can’t”  ie  what  is  a  policy  and  what  is  a  guideline 
    1X2 1X    
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
2 “1X”  indicates  the  item was mentioned many times 
Bibliography and Appendices: Appendix 11 Page 113 
 
Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Clear, consistent policies and procedures support writing good 
business – continued 
   1      
Assess affordability etc 
Same policy document, with some exceptions, for all users 
Policy must be clear and not ambiguous 
Lending manual is an amalgam of policy and procedures, 
which need to be separate  
Procedure manual to supplement policy manual 
Need to be clear, concise, plain English 
Need to be user-friendly 
Need to accommodate new and experienced lenders 
      1 1 1 
Intent of policy;  Understand the big picture  11   1X 1    
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Stable and consistent lending decisions 1         
Consistency between products 1 1        
Consistency between lenders (across and up and down)  1   1 1X    
Awareness of the credit cycle; Learning lessons from prior 
campaigns/periods 
 11       1 
Introducer management   1       
Power of introducers ie want to keep them on side.  Policy 
looser for introducers – they know how to put up a deal and 
how to take one to a higher authority.  A direct customer does 
not know how to do that 
    1 11    
Introducers have ownership of what they do and send in 
quality applications 
     1    
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Sales management;  Branch interface;  Well informed mobile 
lenders 
      1X  1X 
Correct  data  input  (ie  don’t  lie),  training,  disciplinary  action  if  
get wrong,  sufficient staff, less than 10% error in data entry 
and analysis of info., take the customer side, believe the 
customer too much 
  1X 1X      
Customers should have indication of what they bring in to 
make an application, to help Branch staff enter accurate 
information 
  1       
Sales managers need to tell sales staff what is going on; trained 
sales force 
    1 1    
Good system     1     
Check logic of data entry; policies out of date ie matches 
policy; correct referrals; out of date generally; not purpose 
built for Bank; that works 
1 X 1 X 1 X 1 X   11 1X 1 
Good telephone system/process to manage incoming calls, so 
customers  do  not  have  to  wait  too  long:    “ 
       1  
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Credit scoring          
Scoring and automation 11 111        
Up to date scorecard which is not reduced to increase the 
numbers ie. consistent/standardised regardless of loan 
application source 
     1    
Scoring for existing customers as well as new accounts  1        
Credit officers have more knowledge of scorecard, so they can 
advise customer of reasons.  Need an indication at least 
     11    
Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
“More  automation  of  the  actual  assessment  process  so  that  the  
individual  credit  officers  don’t  have  to  know  volumes  of  credit 
policies  inside  and  out”;;  and  credit  scoring  can  lead  to  be  a  
better decision 
     1  1  
“you’re  still  going  to  need  some  human  interaction.”      1    
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
End to end review of loans          
End to end review of loans versus bit rejected by system ie 
don’t  trust  system,  pride  in  lending  decision 
  1 111      
Don’t  lose  credit  skills  due  to  specialisation in one area   11 11      
Written confirmation in performance management documents 
of quantity versus quality 
  1       
Managers should not expect quality of lending decision and 
quantity (volume) of processing 
  1       
Staff should not go into too much assessment if the system has 
already approved/declined;  should be able to override the 
system if glaringly wrong 
  1 1      
Mortgage is low risk lending   1 11      
Additional security of mortgages changes credit risk profile   1 11      
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Customer focus; Customer interface; Customer retention versus 
new sales 
         
Customer focus (satisfaction has decreased)    111      
Need to focus on servicing and retaining customers and not 
just sales.  Retention team / activity, with retention staff on 
commission with commission based on dollars and not 
numbers; enough staff to handle retention;  not driven by MIS 
(management information systems);  time to talk to customers; 
cross sell opportunities to increase number of products per 
customer; 
    1 1 X    
Eg.  “the  lender  in  the  field  will  do  the  loan  and  run  to  the  next  
one, and forget  about  that  particular  client.    So  there’s  no  
ownership  of  the  particular  work  that  you’re  doing.    And  I  
think  that  if  there’s  no  ownership,  there’s  no  care.” 
        11 
Sell the right product       1  1X 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Good communication          
Good communication of policy changes   1 1      
2 way on policy;  policy setters should understand impact on 
operations 
1 11   111     
Retail credit management meeting is held with Product, Group 
Credit, Head of Retail 
        1 
Good  communication  of  what’s  expected  of  lending  officers   1       
Good communication to overcome specialisation in different 
department 
        1 
Credit authorities     1  1   
Lenders should lose credit authority if error is sufficiently bad         11 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Overrides process          
Good process for referrals up the line    1      
Different amount of work if doing through system or if has to 
be  referred  to  a  higher  authority.    ie  Don’t  think  this  is  
representative of the loan population 
“We  have  to  refer  it  to  retail  lending  and  they  have  a  look  at  it.    
They virtually go through the loans with a fine tooth comb, 
whereas  in  direct,  we’re  just  basically  checking  the  phone  
number  is  correct.”  …  “With  the  declines  as  well, I’ve  found  
that  some  consultants  just  decline  it.”     
  1     11  
“some  of  the  credit  officers  have  got  into  the  habit  of  thinking  
if  I  don’t  sign  the  loan,  somebody  higher  will”  ie  Consistency  
across all areas and upwards.   If referred above, get the same 
answer 
     1    
Standardised process assists consistency and ease of learning        1  
Data integrity;  Quality control of information  1 1 1111      
Compliance testing what is going into the application (Branch)   1       
Auto-decisioning requires good data to be input         1 
QA, hindsighting (not to approve, but retrospective QA)         1 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Tools/empowerment to do the job     11     
PC, computer access, CRAA access     1     
Number of staff;  Statistics and volume          
Need enough time, staff to do the job properly;  # staff to 
volumes 
   11  11    
Volume statistics  1    11    
Sales performance rewards and motivation          
Branches forced to write volume not quality   1       
Sales not too dependent on high commissions;  commission 
structure should not encourage sale of wrong product 
     11 1  11 
Need to have good ethics       1   
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Credit staff:  Training / experience / demonstrate sound credit skills 
/ development 
         
Personal training / inherent ability    11      
Assessors with sound lending knowledge and experience  1111        
Career paths  111        
Training for credit people  111 1 11111  11  11  
Education requirements  11        
Perception of the economy/market    1      
Specialisation means have lost credit skills    1      
Feedback on loans the lending officers have written    111   1  1 
Career paths          
working up through the ranks    1      
Should be available        1  
Flexible working conditions        1X  
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Performance management  11        
Feedback on loans the lending officers have written    111      
Lenders should feel they are important assets to the Bank    1  1    
Staff  “who  want  to  care”;;    performance  measurement  and  
reward structure;  reward cross sell;  simple little bits of 
recognition’  “want  to  feel  important  ie  be  recognised”;;    
performance management is a farce;  compensation to match 
performance rankings 
    1     
Targets, small awards, regular MIS       1 111 11 
Credit Officers should be able to learn from experience 
without punishment 
      1 1 1 
Integrity / morality (sleep at night) 1 11  1      
Personal  pride:    “Because  you  just  have  this  loyalty  to  the  
Bank,  well  I  do,  I  wouldn’t  want  to  just  make  a  sale  and  know  
that  that  money  was  going  to  be  spent  and  never  repaid.” 
        1 
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Support and communication between Lending Officers and areas          
Support / on the job training from co-workers / feed off other 
areas 
 111  11      
Need good communication between field staff, credit officers 
and Group credit 
      1   
Need good communication between between areas eg. sales 
and credit 
1   111      
Interaction between Lending Officers and with Senior Lending 
Officers 
         
Discussion between lending areas    11      
Consistency between credit policy and operations  1        
Staff management – supportive, good  1111  1      
Good communication with Team Leaders        1  
Consistent drivers / integration between areas    11        
Sales and credit work together    1      
Existing customers 1         
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Consistency between product areas;  all products taken into 
account (in serviceability) 
1 1 11 11      
Centralisation is a negative    1       
Mortgage insurer and Bank policies should align   1       
If deals are marginal, just reject them     1     
Get the (credit decisioning) basics right     1  1   
Respect the basics eg. serviceability calculations are not 
predictive of problem loans 
      1   
Bottom line is common sense       1   
Consumer credit code:  Initially, hard to define   “what   is  
reasonable”  but  lenders  get  better  with  experience 
      1   
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Dimension Bank A 
Cards 
Focus 
Bank A 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank A 
Mor 
Focus 
Bank A 
Mor 
1on1 
Bank B 
Focus 1 
Bank B 
Focus 2 
Bank C 
Focus 
Bank C 
Cards 
1on1 
Bank C 
Mor 
1on1 
Processes in place to overcome the lack of relationship with 
borrower.  Representative comments drawn from various 
interviews include: 
         
A good client interview process to extract appropriate 
information.  Computer has broken down the information 
exchange, so is efficient and timely turnaround, but still need 
to get the full information the first time around 
A  means  to  maintain  contact  with  customer:    “previously  there  
was a real relationship with the customer, and with that dying, 
I guess you need some sort of quality credit culture.  You need 
to maintain your contact with the customer.  I mean for 
sensible  reasons  really”  (eg.  for  increased  sales) 
A  means  to  identify  problems  early:    “And  you  also  built  up  a  
lot of relationships, I mean that was the key thing, I mean you 
got people who would speak to you if they were in strife, 
whereas  now,  they  don’t  speak  to  you,  they  hide…  They’ll  
delay coming to you before they give you the problem, 
whereas there you could see it, and you could tackle it and 
maybe  overt  it” 
“sometimes I think am I old fashioned or what.  Whereas 
people used to have some form of rapport with the person that 
they  were  talking  too.    They’d  have  one  person  that  they  dealt  
with,  in  terms  of  Banking,  whether  it’s  lending,  or  discussing  
finance  with  them” 
         
  
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12 Issues Particularly Pertinent to Individual Banks 
This Appendix provides a summary of the issues which appeared key to one bank only. 
 
End-to-end review of loans (Bank A Secured).  The issue reflects the concern the Mortgage Lenders 
have with what they perceive to be the de-skilling of their job, with the increased usage of decision 
trees and scorecards.  The finding reflects the comparatively recent move towards automation the 
Secured area in Bank A.  The issue has been raised in Bank A Unsecured also,  though not as 
vehemently.  Indicative comments include: 
 
 “I  could  not   leave   this  centre   tomorrow  to   take  a   transfer  or   to   leave   (the  Bank)  and  say   that   I  
have got good credit skills.  I had good credit skills before I came here, and this is just probably a 
result  of  automation,  I  think  that  now  I’ve  just  fallen  into  the  slot  that  (the  Bank)  wants  me  to  sit  in,  
and  from  there  you  just  don’t  deviate  too  much.    So  it’s  a  bit  battery  hennish  in  that  regard.”         
 
A key point is that (in the Lending Officers’  opinion)  Bank  A  have  not  made  explicit  what  is  required  
of   the   Lending  Officers.     The  Lending  Officers   are   concerned   that   they  will   be   “punished”   if   they  
complete the loan analysis using the new process and a bad decision was the outcome, as compared to 
the  way   the  Lenders   thought   they  should   lend  associated  with  a  “good”  decision.     Lending  Officers  
also appeared reluctant to cease undertaking what they think is an adequate level of loan review, on 
the basis of professional pride. 
 
The end-to-end review of loans has not been identified as issue in the other Banks, possibly because:   
 Bank B has previously gone through the standardisation process a number of years prior to the 
interviews.  Lending Officers had either adapted to the new process or left the Bank (with 
extensive redundancies having being made by the Bank) 
 In Bank C, the researcher talked with the group of Lending Officers who are still conducting a full 
review of the loan applications. 
 
Tools/empowerment to do the job (Bank B Secured/Unsecured).  The issue is highly associated with 
very basic infrastructural issues such as the access to personal computers, stationery and, a direct 
credit reference link.  It appears that the Bank has ceased spending on the infrastructural items due to a 
significant focus on cost and impending outsourcing of a large proportion of the lending function.  
 
The  other  “big  ideas”  to  result  from  the  Bank  B  inlcude: 
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 The under-servicing  of  existing  customers:    “Service and sales are different issues.  What we do at 
the moment is purely turnaround.” 
 The   role   of  Mortgage   originators:      “The   introducers   run   the   bank   ...5   years   ago  we  weren’t   so  
highly   dependent   on   those   introducers   and   brokers,   but   now   we   are.      And   there’s   the   big  
difference. And it has a major impact on what the current culture is.” 
 
Sell the right product (Bank C Secured).  The issue appears to be a function of the behaviour of 
mobile lenders who are compensated on the volume of sales rather than necessarily providing 
customers with the most appropriate product.  It is reported that the revolving credit products are being 
sold  to  customers  as  they  were  “easy”  to  sell,  rather  than  matching  the  customers  needs.  The  issue  is  
highly associated with the Branch performance measurement category, as it relates to mobile lenders 
receiving the appropriate compensation and having a customer focus. 
 
The issue is particularly likely to be an issue with Bank C as: 
 The revolving credit product is a reasonably recent product launch 
 The product is being sold through a relatively new channel (mobile lenders) which lenders were 
very critical of 
 The Bank has a reputation of being very focused on meeting customer requirements.   
 
It is not likely that this will be an issue for Bank B, as the product in question has been sold for a long 
time.  It is not likely to be an issue in Bank A as the product is not a major component of sales.  
 
However, the role of Branch staff in introducing loans to the Banks was a major issue raised by all 
Banks.   
                                              
Flexible working conditions (Bank C Unsecured).  Flexible working conditions have been raised as a 
very   positive   feature   of   Bank  C’s   unsecured   operations   (where   comparatively   low-skilled staff can 
work non-standard hours).  However, the emergence of this item in Bank C alone probably is a sample 
artifact – the sample was comprised primarily of permanent part-timers who work flexible hours.  
Where the interviewee was a full-timer within Bank C, the issue has not been raised. 
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13 Comparison of the Notes that were Jotted Down but Not Raised in 
the Interviews 
This  Appendix  highlights  issues  which  were  jotted  down  on  the  Lending  Officer  interviewee’s  
information sheets (refer Appendix 1.8),but not raised in the subsequent interview. 
 
 
What drives the tightening 
/ easing of credit 
standards? 
 
Bank A 
- Centralised departments 
- Well balanced portfolio 
 
 
Bank B 
- More than one person evaluating and signing off on 
particular deals 
 
 
Bank C 
- Nil report 
 
 
Quality credit process 
 
Bank A 
- Common sense 
- Up-to-date information on consumer trends and competitor 
practices 
- Relevant equipment 
 
 
Bank B 
- Support from senior management 
- Common sense 
 
 
 
Bank C 
- Checking of portfolio historical data to see whether policies 
are good / bad / irrelevant 
- Things do go wrong – not everybody tells the truth 
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14 Data sources for Empirical Evidence of Credit Rationing  
This Appendix shows the various sources of data which were considered in the attempt to find 
empirical evidence of credit rationing. 
Tightening/easing of credit policies 
The feasibility of examining the number of credit policies tightened versus loosened in a given 
organisation in a given time span was considered.  Whilst the approach could provide a comparatively 
objective measure of the credit risk attitude, this did not appear to be a viable option as: 
 Banks were reluctant to share this level of very detailed information 
 The credit policies might not change, but their interpretation and application at the operational 
level could vary widely 
 Changes in credit policies were not necessarily well documented within FIs; The approval rate was 
highly associated with the quality of the applications (and might not reflect a change in the risk 
appetite) 
 The  FIs  had  different  definitions  of  the  variables,  such  as  “retail”  versus  “small  business”. 
Review of loan applications 
Another option considered was a review by the researcher of loan applications approved by an FI, 
leading to personal judgement on whether credit officers were being more or less generous in their 
credit decisions.  However:  
 The information was difficult to access, with FIs being reluctant both to share the information and 
assign resources to gathering the information 
 The approach was still subjective; There was limited variation in loan structure and conditions 
within retail portfolios, which made it more difficult to isolate differences in lending standards 
 A high proportion of credit decisions were made automatically through application credit scoring 
systems 
 The sample period was relatively short. 
 It was not possible  to  examine  the  reasons  behind  the  changes,  in  terms  of  the  Lending  Officers’  
judgement / perceptions. 
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Level of provisioning 
The levels of loan provisions held appeared to be an option for tracking the inherent credit risk in the 
portfolio, as provisions were designed to reflect the likely charge to the FI from bad debt.  However, 
the movement in loan provisioning was not feasible given:   
 The lack of a common definition, model or methodology for allocating loan provisions 
 Some FIs had considerably more sophisticated, and presumably more accurate, methodologies 
than other Fis 
 FIs had a different tolerance for risk when assigning provisions 
 Reserves the FI had set aside previously for loans affect provisioning movement and expectations 
of the provisioning 
 Introduction of economic loss (dynamic) provisioning in recent years meant that provisions held 
did not necessarily reflect the current portfolio quality 
 The drive for bottom-line profit in a given year affected the pressure to increase or lower 
provisioning differentially for different organisations. 
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15 Issues Emerging from the Senior Credit Manager and Lending 
Officer Interviews (Combined) 
This Appendix summarises the key issues to emerge across the Senior Manager and Lending Officer 
Interviews (excluding  the  literature  review),  in  terms  of  the  “old  chestnuts”  versus  emerging  issues. 
The  “old  chestnuts” fell into two main categories:  The setting / communicating of credit objectives 
and the lending process. 
 
Credit 
objectives 
Balanced and consistent credit/marketing objectives are required.  
“Volume  for  volume’s  sake”  never  works.    However,  we  repeat  the  same  
mistakes again and again. 
 
FIs   should   “stick   with   their   knitting”,   and   not   be   dragged   into   lending  
portfolios and standards which are beyond their long term risk appetite by 
the less informed competitors. 
 
Short termism can drive sub-optimisation with a focus on short-term 
volume growth and cost cutting versus long-term credit losses. A concise 
response to the question as to what drove the credit risk attitude was 
“Greed”.     
 
Performance management systems should measure and reward the 
behaviours required to achieve organisation-wide objectives. 
 
Pricing should reflect risk, to the extent possible with existing information 
and systems. 
 
Credit standards should be actively managed through: 
- Awareness of market factors with competitor benchmarking of 
trends (but not blindly following the pack) 
- Counter-cyclical or, at the very least, consistent lending. 
 
Senior Credit Managers should actively monitor and  manage   the  “credit  
culture”,   ensuring   that   they   understand   how   the   credit   risk   attitude   is  
interpreted and put into practice throughout the organisation.  
 
Good communication should be used to manage both the formal and the 
informal communication mechanisms. 
 
All members of the credit organisation should be told the intent of credit 
policies  and  understand  the  “big  picture”. 
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The credit 
basics 
An appropriate credit infrastructure should support Lending Officers in 
doing their job, including: 
- Good, solid, consistent lending policies and procedures 
- Good systems 
- Credit authorities and practices at an appropriate level of 
empowerment 
- There is segregation of duties. Single credit signatories are not 
allowed 
- Inappropriate use of credit authorities resulting in disciplinary 
actions.  However, Lending Officers should be able to learn from 
experience without fear of punishment 
- Exceptions (overrides) being managed carefully 
- Policies and practices reflecting the current legislation 
- Acknowledgment that most borrowers  who  default  are  “unlucky”  
for the same reasons (unemployment/bankruptcy, illness, marital 
breakup) 
- The   need   to   “protect”   borrowers   from   themselves”   in   that   they  
don’t   plan   ahead   and   are   not   aware   of   the   repayments   they   can  
afford. 
 
Organisation and staffing should provide: 
- Good, supportive, accessible managers 
- Staff who are experienced, trained and capable in making lending 
decisions 
- Feedback to staff on the credit quality of their portfolio, including 
the credit performance of their lending portfolios 
- Comprehensive performance management plans for staff 
- Clearly defined career paths for staff. 
- A sufficient number of capable staff to handle the volumes. 
 
Common sense should prevail in all lending-related decisions. 
 
Managers should not assume they know what   the   Lending   Officers’  
interpretation of the credit culture is.  A small difference in interpretation 
and / or implementation of the relatively intangible construct of credit 
culture can have a significant effect on portfolio quality.  
 
Lending Officers should be comfortable that Bank policies are prudential 
(and borrowers are not overcommitted) so that the Lending Officers can 
“sleep  at  night”. 
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Some of the emerging/prominent issues through the 1990s are shown below. 
 
Information Information is one of the most critical components of a portfolio-based 
approach.  The data and analytics should support the constant testing and 
improvement of policy and practice. 
Functional 
specialisation 
The level of centralisation needs to be carefully managed.  Both 
centralised and decentralised models can work - they just have their own 
management requirements. 
Changed 
marketing 
model and 
accountabilities 
Strong management of the new distribution channels (mobile lenders, 
Branch staff, and Introducers) is required.  The right product should be 
sold to the customer, regardless of source or commission structure. 
 
The transition to line of business ownership of credit, where applicable, 
should be supported by: 
- Clearly defined accountabilities between the business unit and the 
centralised credit function 
- Experienced credit staff in the centralised group risk function and 
the decentralised lines of business. 
Communication 
between units 
The formal and informal communication mechanisms should be carefully 
managed to ensure an end-to-end feedback loop exists between the 
functionally specialised units. 
Organisational 
learning 
Organisational learning becomes more important as a result of the 
turnover of credit staff and changing roles. 
Cost cutting The pressure on lending margins can lead to cost-cutting at the expense 
of: 
- Credit standards 
- Levels of experienced, trained and capable lending staff 
- Future business development opportunities. 
Controls When changing to a portfolio-based approach, it is necessary to 
implement a totally new system of controls in conjunction with the 
improved information.  Controls should be increased to offset the effects 
of automation, functional specialisation, empowerment and cost-cutting 
initiatives.  Credit risk is an ecosystem – if lending standards or practices 
are eased in one area, a compensating control should be established 
elsewhere. 
Systems Decision support systems and workflow management systems for 
portfolio quality and operational effectiveness are critical.  The effect on 
the job experience and experience for credit risk staff should be carefully 
managed 
Credit 
strategies 
Senior Credit Managers should provide a clear picture of the credit 
strategy driving the use of the methodologies and ensure the strategic 
direction is encapsulated in policies and practices.  Care must be taken to 
get the strategy right, or the errors will be systemic. 
 
It  is  not  possible  to  depend  on  the  Lending  Officer’s  common  sense  in  the  
origination process as:  A large proportion of the decisions are embedded 
in the decision support system; Lending Officers will, on average, be less 
experienced and skilled; and, functional specialisation means Lending 
Officers do not see the end-to-end process.   
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Portfolio 
management 
The external environment and the internal policies / practices which drive 
portfolio quality should be monitored and incorporated into decision 
making in the un-ending balancing between the short-term revenue 
growth and cost reduction objectives and the longer term credit losses. 
 
Risk-based pricing should reflect the customer life-cycle profitability.  
The information is required to both establish the pricing centrally and 
communicate   the   information   to   all   of   the   relevant   customer   “touch  
points”  throughout  the  organisation. 
 
Credit scoring models should be established, maintained well and 
understood by staff. 
 
Provisioning methodologies and capital allocation should be carefully 
managed.  Profit models for each portfolio segments should reflect 
differential treatment. 
 
FIs need to increase the level of sophistication and hence have confidence 
in their measures of portfolio quality.  The following techniques were 
seen to be important:  
- Enhancing risk / reward performance measurement tools (eg. 
RAROC, risk grading systems) and portfolio monitoring capability 
- Credit trading / derivative capabilities 
- Reduction in absolute risk concentrations (ie diversification). 
Changed staff 
roles and 
performance 
management 
 
Staff expectations and skills should reflect the lower skill-base required 
(on average).  The issue is particularly important where existing more 
highly and multi-skilled staff are asked to do less skilled and varied tasks.  
However, sufficient highly experienced and capable credit staff should be 
retained to review the complex loan applications and establish the rules 
which are embedded in work processes. 
 
Flexible working hours should be encouraged, to 
- Meet  the  customers’  expected  turnaround  times 
- Offer credit staff flexible working conditions 
- Maximise contact rates when the FIs attempt to contact customers 
(for example, in Collections operations).  
Customer 
relationship 
A focus on operating efficiencies can lead to relationship breakdowns.  
The lack of face-to-face contact should be offset by other benefits (such 
as lower price or ease of access by phone or electronic mechanisms). 
 
Existing relationships should be treated favourably to aid retention, rather 
than focusing on building new business only (in terms of pricing and 
credit standards). 
 
Customer relationship pricing should be instituted. 
Responsiveness Responsiveness within the FI to changing market and other external 
conditions is imperative. 
 
Responsiveness to customers is important in association with extensive 
disintermediation and the traditional relationship between bank and 
customer breaking down. 
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Economic and 
borrower 
factors 
Borrowers have a changed response to repayment responsibilities, 
reflected in increased incidence in bankruptcy in a relatively benign part 
of the credit cycle. 
 
The considerably higher level of personal debt that consumers are 
carrying means that assumptions derived from historical trends may not 
apply in the downturn of this economic cycle. 
 
The effect of managing finances in an environment of low inflation and 
interest rates will have to be incorporated, in terms of both the FIs ability 
to on-sell security on problem loans and the customers ability to manage 
their finances. 
 
The high usage of mortgage insurers may change the dynamics of the 
retailed secured lending portfolios. 
Alignment of 
credit culture, 
risk attitude, 
climate and 
infrastructure 
Senior Credit Managers should be aware that the applications they are 
seeing (which are referred for a higher credit signatory) are not 
necessarily reflective of all applications.   As noted by a Lending Officer 
of a referred application:    “We  have  to  refer  it  to  retail  lending  and  they  
have a look at it.  They virtually go through the loans with a fine tooth 
comb,  whereas  in  direct,  we’re  just  basically  checking  the  phone  number  
is  correct.” 
 
Further, if Senior Management are (sub)consciously relaxing standards, 
the Lending Officers will perceive the relaxation of standards. It is 
possible that the effect will be doubled, as the Lending Officers apply 
more liberal interpretations of the already relaxed standards.   
 
The  importance  of  the  congruence  between   the  Senior  Credit  Managers’  
intentions   and   the   Lending   Officers’   perceptions   was   highlighted   by  
disparity of responses in the Credit Confidence Survey (Senior Managers) 
and Interviews (Lending Officers).  In addition, it was reported in the 
Senior Credit Manager interviews that all or most of the other banks were 
moving into disaster myopia stage, although none of the Banks reported 
themselves as having lowered standards. 
Changed 
expectations of 
credit risk 
management 
There has been a fundamental change to the performance expectations of 
credit   risk  managers.     No   longer   does   “conservative”   loss  minimisation  
equal good performance.  Credit risk managers are expected to work to 
optimise long-term profitability, with improved information and analysis 
providing the basis of common objectives 
 
 
Bibliography and Appendices: Appendix 16 Page   137 
16 Credit Confidence Survey Questionnaire & Covering (2) Letters 
This Appendix provides a copy of the Questionnaire sent to the FIs, along with the covering letters 
for (i) the top 9 Banks and (ii) the medium sized FIs. 
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Sample  covering  letter  to  be  forwarded  to  “top  9”  banks 
 
xxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxx 
Our ref 
 
Contact 
RM98sCredConflna-02311.doc 
 
Jenny Fagg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 XXXX 0000 
Your ref  
 
 
Dear xxxxxxx 
 
Credit confidence survey 
Over the last 12 to 18 months, we have seen considerable swings in perception concerning 
the availability and the pricing of credit.  Not long ago, regulators in both Australia and the 
United States voiced concerns about falling credit standards and pricing not reflecting risk.  
More  recently,  there  has  been  reporting  of  concerns  about  a  “credit  crunch”  in  overseas  
markets, although several leading bankers have said there is no evidence of this occurring 
in Australia. 
 
KPMG has developed a Credit Confidence Survey to obtain a definitive measure of the 
tightening - or otherwise - of credit standards in major segments of the Australian domestic 
markets.  The Survey is being sent to a Senior Credit Officer in each major Australian 
lending institution. 
 
Results of the Credit Confidence Survey will be forwarded to financial institutions which 
have responded to the Survey.  In addition, respondents will be invited to attend a Credit 
Manager’s  forum  to  discuss  the  key  trends  and  issues  associated  with  credit risk and its 
management. 
 
The Credit Confidence Survey incorporates all lending portfolios.  It has been adapted from 
a  survey  conducted  in  the  United  States  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  namely  the  “Senior  
Lending  Officers  Opinion  Survey”.    The  Credit  Confidence Survey is comprised primarily 
of subjective or interpretive responses which require little analysis of financial information.  
In addition, there is one table of key credit performance measures. 
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We envisage that the Credit Confidence Survey will be issued once or twice a year to 
enable the measurement of  credit standards across the business cycle.  However, the 
frequency will depend on the interest that financial institutions demonstrate in the Survey. 
 
The responses to the Credit Confidence Survey will remain confidential to KPMG.  Only 
aggregated data will be reported.  If there is any chance of a financial institution being 
identified, the results will not be reported.  We shall be pleased to discuss your response 
prior to any publication of aggregated results.   
 
We would greatly appreciate it if you would take the time to complete the Credit 
Confidence Survey.  With your assistance, we can build the consistent, reliable and 
comprehensive benchmarks which will provide useful information for market participants. 
 
Could you please return the completed Survey by December 20, 1998.  We will contact you 
next week, to arrange a meeting for us to assist you or a colleague in completing the 
Survey.   
If you have any questions relating to the Credit Confidence Survey, please contact 
Jenny Fagg, KPMG Credit Risk Management: 
 
Telephone: 03 9288 6760 or 0417 571 201 
Email:  jfagg@kpmg.com.au. 
Fax:    03 9288 5977. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
xxxxxxx 
Partner 
 
Enclosure 
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Sample covering letter to be forwarded to 
 “medium  sized”  banks 
 
«Title» «FirstName» «LastName» 
«JobTitle» 
Our ref RM98sCredConfInbb-O0412.doc 
«Company» 
«Address» 
«Suburb» «State» «PostalCode» 
Contact Jenny Fagg 
00 xxxxxxxx 0000 
Your ref 
 
Dear «Title» «LastName» 
 
Credit confidence survey 
 
Over the last 12 to 18 months, we have seen considerable swings in perception concerning 
the availability and the pricing of credit.  Not long ago, regulators in both Australia and the 
United States voiced concerns about falling credit standards and pricing not reflecting risk.  
More   recently,   there   has   been   reporting   of   concerns   about   a   “credit   crunch”   in   overseas  
markets, although several leading bankers have said there is no evidence of this occurring 
in Australia. 
 
KPMG has developed a Credit Confidence Survey to obtain a definitive measure of the 
tightening - or otherwise - of credit standards in major segments of the Australian domestic 
markets.  The Survey is being sent to a Senior Credit Officer in each major Australian 
lending institution. 
 
Results of the Credit Confidence Survey will be forwarded to financial institutions which 
have responded to the Survey.  In addition, respondents will be invited to attend a Credit 
Manager’s   forum   to   discuss   the   key   trends   and   issues   associated  with   credit   risk   and   its  
management. 
 
The Credit Confidence Survey incorporates all lending portfolios.  It has been adapted from 
a   survey   conducted   in   the   United   States   by   the   Federal   Reserve,   namely   the   “Senior  
Lending  Officers  Opinion  Survey”.    The  Credit  Confidence  Survey  is  comprised primarily 
of subjective or interpretive responses which require little analysis of financial information.  
In addition, there is one table of key credit performance measures. 
 
We envisage that the Credit Confidence Survey will be issued once or twice a year to 
enable the measurement of  credit standards across the business cycle.  However, the 
frequency will depend on the interest that financial institutions demonstrate in the Survey. 
 
The responses to the Credit Confidence Survey will remain confidential to KPMG.  Only 
aggregated data will be reported.  If there is any chance of a financial institution being 
identified, the results will not be reported. 
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We would greatly appreciate it if you would take the time to complete the Credit 
Confidence Survey.  With your assistance, we can build the consistent, reliable and 
comprehensive benchmarks which will provide useful information for market participants.  
Could you please return the completed Survey by January 22, 1998.  
 
If you have any questions relating to the Credit Confidence Survey, please contact 
Jenny Fagg, KPMG Credit Risk Management: 
 
Telephone:  03 9288 6760 or 0417 571 201 
Email:  jfagg@kpmg.com.au. 
Fax:    03 9288 5977 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
xxxxxxxx 
Partner 
 
Enclosure 
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17 Credit Confidence Survey Report 
A copy of the complete Credit Confidence Survey report follows. 
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